Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2020

Does Revlon Matter? A Empirical and Theoretical Study
Matthew D. Cain Ph. D.
Berkley Law, mdcain@outlook.com

Sean J. Griffith
Fordham University School of Law, sgriffith@law.fordham.edu

Robert J. Jackson Jr.
New York University School of Law, robert.j.jackson@nyu.edu

Steven D. Solomon
Berkley Law, steven.solomon@law.berkeley.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew D. Cain Ph. D., Sean J. Griffith, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Steven D. Solomon, Does Revlon
Matter? A Empirical and Theoretical Study, 108 Cal. L. Rev. 1683 (2020)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/1139

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Does Revlon Matter? An Empirical and
Theoretical Study
Matthew D. Cain*, Sean J. Griffith**, Robert J. Jackson, Jr.***, and
Steven Davidoff Solomon****
We empirically examine whether and how the doctrine of
enhanced judicial scrutiny that emerged from Revlon and its progeny
actually affects M&A transactions. Combining hand-coding and
machine-learning techniques, we assemble data from the proxy
statements of publicly announced mergers between 2003 and 2017 into
a dataset of 1,913 unique transactions. Of these, 1,167 transactions
were subject to the Revlon standard, and 553 were not. After
subjecting this sample to empirical analysis, our results show that
Revlon does indeed matter for companies incorporated in Delaware.
We find that in Delaware, Revlon deals are more intensely negotiated,
involve more bidders, and result in higher transaction premiums than
non-Revlon deals. However, these results do not hold for target
companies incorporated in other jurisdictions that have adopted the
Revlon doctrine.
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Our results shed light on the implications of the current state of
uncertainty surrounding Revlon and provide some direction for courts
going forward. We theorize that Revlon is a monitoring standard
whose effectiveness depends upon the judiciary’s credible commitment
to intervene in biased transactions. The precise contours of the
doctrine are unimportant as long as the judiciary retains a substantive
avenue for intervention. Recent Delaware decisions in C&J and
Corwin have been criticized for overly restricting Revlon, but we
suggest that such concerns are overstated so long as Delaware judges
continue to monitor the substance of transactions. Thus, in applying
these decisions, Delaware judges should focus not on procedural
aspects but the substantive component of transactions, which Revlon
initially sought to regulate.
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INTRODUCTION
The Revlon doctrine has reached almost mythical status. Named after the
seminal case Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,1 the doctrine holds that
in a change-of-control transaction, a seller board is required to seek and achieve

1.

506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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the highest price reasonably available.2 Revlon is one of the few cases every
corporate lawyer knows.3 The case has been cited thousands of times in
Westlaw.4 It is covered in every corporations casebook and has been the subject
of hundreds of law review articles. Most importantly, it has become the
touchstone for the substantive judicial review of mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) transactions.
But does Revlon really matter? That is, has it actually affected the sale
process of transactions subject to it? And, if so, how?
In this Article, we conduct an in-depth empirical examination of the effect
of the Revlon doctrine on the takeover process. We theorize that the Revlon
doctrine—by promising substantive judicial review—results in target boards
engaging in more search and negotiation in their sale process.5 More specifically,
we theorize that target boards acting under Revlon will have more bidders during
the private negotiating process, will engage in more protracted negotiations with
these bidders, will have more third-party bidder interventions postannouncement, and will ultimately achieve higher premiums.
We examine these questions through a novel M&A dataset of 1,913
transactions from 2003 to 2017. We build this dataset by hand-coding and
applying machine-language learning techniques to proxy and tender offer
statements describing the bidding process. We collect information on a number
of variables, including bidding rounds, number of bidders, types of acquirers
(e.g., private equity versus strategic), and prices negotiated.
We find, essentially, that Revlon matters, at least for Delaware firms. For
Delaware-incorporated firms, deals within Revlon result in more protracted
negotiations, more rounds of bidding, more bidders, and higher deal premiums.
However, these results do not hold for states outside of Delaware that have also
adopted Revlon. When we exclude Delaware-incorporated firms, we find no
differences in any key variables for Revlon and non-Revlon deals. Revlon
matters, but it appears to matter only in Delaware.
2. Id. at 182; see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del.
1989) (“[I]n a sale of corporate control the responsibility of the directors is to get the highest value
reasonably attainable for the shareholders.”); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.
1989) (“[T]he board must act in a neutral manner to encourage the highest possible price for
shareholders.”).
3. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing
Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 324 (2018)
(describing Revlon as one of a “Golden Quartet” of momentous corporate law decisions).
4. The case has been cited 5,106 times in Westlaw, including in 1,722 law review articles (as
of Sept. 16, 2020).
5. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 298–99 (3d ed. 2012)
(distilling Revlon to require even-handed treatment of bidders and a sales process “reasonably designed
to elicit the best possible offer”); see also Frank v. Elgamal, No. 6120-VCN, 2014 WL 957550, at *20–
21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 2014) (noting “best practices” that may satisfy Revlon, including “[s]oliciting
potential acquirers in advance of agreeing to a transaction” and considering “alternative transactions
offered by any responsible buyer”) (quoting Wells Fargo & Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp, Nos. 14696,
14623, 1996 WL 32169, at *4 n.3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1996)).
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These results do not appear to be driven by other transaction-specific
characteristics. For example, although we find, consistent with other studies, that
private equity buyers pay significantly lower premiums (up to 8% lower on
average), our other results remain qualitatively similar, indicating that private
equity transactions do not alter our results. Nor are our results driven by the
unique characteristics of “mergers of equals” (MOEs), whereby the parties
deliberately do not seek out other bidders or focus on premium because the
transaction value is in the strategic combination of the companies. In a series of
robustness tests, we find significant bidding in non-Revlon transactions, a fact
inconsistent with the idea that MOEs drive our results.
On average, Revlon transactions in Delaware have multiple bidders 60% of
the time, 5.83 bidding rounds, a negotiation period of about four and a half
months, and a 37% offer premium. Non-Revlon transactions in Delaware have
multiple bidders 32% of the time, 4.49 bidding rounds, a negotiation period of
about three months, and a 27% offer premium. We further test this finding by
examining the twenty-three MOE transactions in our sample. We find that these
transactions have significantly lower measures of these variables than both
Revlon and non-Revlon transactions, which indicates that our findings are not
driven by MOEs.6
So, given our findings that Revlon matters, what can we say about how it
matters? The differing results between Delaware and other states adopting
Revlon offer a clue. Although several states have adopted the doctrine, we find
that it has an effect in Delaware alone. We explain this finding by reference to
the more active and focused Delaware judiciary, which has a core competency
in M&A transactions. Delaware courts have thus been more willing to
substantively review and intervene in transactions which violate Revlon.7 This
may be true even today, where Delaware courts intervene considerably less often
than they did in the 1980s. The credible threat to intervene may be enough. The
threat is credible in Delaware because its judiciary has demonstrated its

6. Revlon applies when there is a change of control, “regardless of whether or not there is to be
a break-up of the corporation.” Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994).
In QVC Network, the court held that a change of control did not occur when the shares of the combined
companies were “owned by a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders both before and after the
merger . . . .” Id. at 46–47. These non-Revlon transactions are still subject to scrutiny under the Unocal
doctrine. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985); infra notes 18–
22 and accompanying text.
7. This is a form of enhanced scrutiny. The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that in a Revlon
deal:
The key features of an enhanced scrutiny test are: (a) a judicial determination regarding the
adequacy of the decisionmaking process employed by the directors, including the
information on which the directors based their decision; and (b) a judicial examination of the
reasonableness of the directors’ action in light of the circumstances then existing. The
directors have the burden of proving that they were adequately informed and acted
reasonably.
QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 45.
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willingness to intervene. In other states, the threat of judicial intervention is less
credible, and Revlon is therefore less meaningful.
Seeing Revlon as a flexible monitoring standard suggests a course for its
future evolution. We follow corporate law theory in justifying judicial
intervention in M&A as a constraint on managerial rent-seeking at a time when
opportunism is relatively unconstrained by other norms. Judicial intervention
may thus be less necessary when other constraints retain their force. But when
alternative constraints weaken, as in final period sale-of-the-company
transactions, the case for judicial intervention strengthens.
These considerations provide insight into the debate surrounding two recent
Delaware decisions that seem to substantially restrict the scope of Revlon duties.
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC eliminated breach of fiduciary duty
claims if full disclosure was made to the shareholder prior to the shareholder
vote.8 Read together with C&J Energy Services v. City of Miami General
Employees’ and Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust,9 which purported to
limit the ability of Delaware courts to grant injunctions under Revlon, Corwin
would seem to confine Revlon either to transactions involving materially
inadequate disclosure or to transactions where a third-party bidder seeks an
injunction. Yet our results hold even when we control for these cases. We suggest
two interpretations for this non-result. First, it may be that in spite of the ways in
which Corwin and C&J change the law, M&A practitioners continue to advise
clients based on prior norms and practices. Alternatively, it may be that
notwithstanding Corwin and C&J, Delaware courts have found ample space for
judicial review albeit through different mechanisms.
Ultimately, our results indicate that while Revlon matters, it seems to matter
only in an ecosystem where there is the potential for consistent judicial review
and intervention by a competent judiciary. The lesson of Revlon may thus be that
a standard alone is insufficient—it is the implementation and oversight which
counts. As for the criticism of C&J and Corwin, such criticism may be overstated
to the extent that Revlon’s core precept—access for judicial intervention into
substantively biased transactions—is preserved.
From this Introduction, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates
Revlon both in corporate law doctrine and corporate law theory, demonstrating
its centrality to both. Part II contains our empirical analysis. It begins by
developing our hypotheses and by describing our sample selection. It then offers
descriptive statistics and elaborates the core findings of our empirical analysis.
Finally, it summarizes a series of robustness checks designed to address
endogeneity concerns. Next, Part III considers the implications of our empirical
analysis by examining how Revlon matters, considering whether the doctrine

8.
9.

See 125 A.3d 304, 312–14 (Del. 2015) (en banc).
See 107 A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014) (en banc).
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ought to be expanded or contracted, and framing the interpretive issues going
forward. Finally, Part IV closes with a brief summary and conclusion.
I.
REVLON’S PLACE IN CORPORATE LAW
Revlon, a decision of the Delaware Supreme Court from nearly thirty-five
years ago, remains the leading case outlining the duties of directors in third-party
mergers. Because Delaware is the most important corporate law jurisdiction,10
Revlon is among the most important cases in modern deal-making. Yet there is
evidence that the Revlon doctrine is now in decline. Indeed, although corporate
law scholars remain divided on the meaning of the doctrine, they broadly agree
that whatever it meant or seemed to mean, Revlon’s bite as a substantive standard
has dissipated.11
This Section situates Revlon in modern corporate law doctrine. It first
examines the origins of the decision and its impact on subsequent corporate law
jurisprudence. It then analyzes the place of Revlon in corporate law theory,
summarizing the prior literature interpreting the opinion and the more recent
debate over its current relevance.
A. The Rise of Revlon
The Revlon doctrine originated with a lawsuit brought by a frustrated thirdparty bidder to enjoin the consummation of a transaction between the target
company and a favored bidder. The case began when the board of cosmetics
company Revlon responded to Ron Perelman’s unsolicited bid for the company
by engaging in a series of defensive maneuvers designed to fend him off. Among
these was the buyback of some of Revlon’s public shares for a class of senior
subordinated notes (the “Notes”). Perelman was determined, however, and
responded to the board’s defensive maneuvers by raising his bid for Revlon. As
a result, the Revlon board determined that the best way to keep Perelman at bay
was to pursue an acquisition with a “white knight” bidder, Forstmann Little
(Forstmann).12 Undeterred, Perelman continued to raise his bid, forcing

10. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993)
(analyzing Delaware’s prominent status in corporate law).
11. See Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Delaware’s
Takeover Standards, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES 29, 29 (Steven Davidoff
Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (“The takeover standards that we learn and teach in law
school—Blasius, Revlon, Unocal, Van Gorkom, and Weinberger—appear to be in decline.”); Charles
R. Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 55, 57
(2019) (noting that Delaware’s response to increased merger litigation “was a substantive relaxation of
the standard of review for merger-related claims, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail”); Cox
& Thomas, supra note 3, at 329 (“In recent decisions, we find that Revlon’s bark is today greatly muffled
and its bite largely nonexistent.”). We further discuss this infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
12. Forstmann, a private equity firm, was content to leave incumbent management in charge of
substantial parts of Revlon, provided they produced sufficient revenue to service the debt incurred in
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Forstmann into a bidding war, which Perelman promised to win by engaging in
fractional bidding to top any Forstmann offer.
Nevertheless, the board declared Forstmann the winner and locked up the
deal by granting Forstmann a below-market option to purchase one of the
company’s most valuable businesses should Revlon be sold to another bidder.
Because the lock-up destroyed his plans for the company, Perelman had no
choice but to sue for an injunction of the Revlon-Forstmann agreement to permit
further rounds of bidding.
The Delaware Supreme Court sided with Perelman, holding that something
about the acquisition process transformed the Revlon board, famously, “from
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”13 While it would remain
unclear for some years exactly what about the acquisition process triggered this
transformation and what precisely was required of boards once the
transformation had occurred, Revlon itself clearly holds that once a company has
opened itself to a bidding process, the board cannot end it without satisfying
itself that the process had maximized shareholder value.
Applying this standard, the court found that Revlon’s board had failed to
maximize shareholder value. The Revlon board argued that it had picked
Forstmann over Perelman because Forstmann offered a better price, better
financing, and had committed to supporting the value of the Notes. Rejecting the
first two rationales as inconsistent with the facts, the court focused on the third,
noting that the board’s principal consideration “appears to have been protection
of the noteholders over the shareholders’ interests.”14 This, the court held, was
the problem. The Revlon board had favored another constituency—creditors—
over shareholders in the sale of the company. The point of the “auctioneer”
analogy is that when the company is sold, the board must maximize shareholder
value in the sale, not creditor value, employee value, or any other constituent
value. Instead, “[m]arket forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the
target’s shareholders the best price available for their equity.”15 In the aftermath
of the case, the duty to maximize shareholder value in a sale-of-the-company
transaction came to be known as “Revlon duties.”
Subsequent cases clarified two lingering questions: (1) what triggered
Revlon duties and (2) what actions were required of boards in satisfying them.
With regard to the first question, Revlon duties are triggered by a “change of
control,” which principally includes an acquisition of target shares for cash, as

connection with the acquisition. CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS’ BALL: THE JUNK-BOND RAIDERS
AND THE MAN WHO STAKED THEM 219 (1988).
13. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
14. Id. at 184.
15. Id.
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in Revlon itself,16 or—in the case of a stock-for-stock acquisition—an acquisition
in which diffusely held public equity is exchanged for shares of a company in
which there is a controlling shareholder.17 The principal transaction type that
does not trigger Revlon is the stock-for-stock deal in which the post-closing
entity remains controlled by disaggregated stockholders.18
With regard to the second question, Revlon duties require boards to conduct
a sale process reasonably designed to maximize shareholder value. However,
Revlon duties do not necessarily require an auction or preclude a transaction
negotiated with a single bidder, as long as the company is exposed to other
bidders either before or after the merger agreement is signed. Many cases finding
a breach of Revlon duties focus on a conflict of interest resulting in the board
favoring one bidder over others for reasons unrelated to shareholders’ wealth.19
This was the case in Revlon itself, in which the court focused both on the personal
antipathy between Ron Perelman and Revlon’s CEO as well as the Revlon
board’s fear of being sued by the holders of the Notes should their value fall
below par.20
16. Immediately after Revlon, cases focused on the initiation of a process to sell or break-up the
company or situations in which a target acquiesces to a takeover offer. See, e.g., Arnold v. Soc’y for
Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994) (en banc) (holding that Revlon duties apply in three
scenarios: (1) a sale involving a break-up, (2) a sale to an unsolicited bidder, and (3) approval of a
change-of-control transaction). However, the concept of a change of control—essentially, a transaction
in which the shareholder base changes, as in a cash-for-stock buyout—logically includes the first two
categories. We therefore focus on the form of consideration in the construction of our dataset.
17. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994). Other
potential triggers for the doctrine have been rejected. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37 (1990) (surveying takeover litigation
to define Revlon’s trigger and legal consequences).
18. Within these non-Revlon transactions, there is a type of transaction known as a merger of
equals. The core principle of a merger of equals is that both parties are equals driven by strategic
considerations where a merger premium is unnecessary. In actuality, mergers of equals often fail due to
the fact that one set of managers typically winds up with the upper hand. See Steven Davidoff Solomon,
To Guide the Merger Giants, Strong Hands Are Needed, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 13, 2014),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/lessons-from-the-breakup-of-an-advertising-merger
[https://perma.cc/9JAR-SMHH] (describing how integration issues turned the Publicis-Omnicom
merger of equals into a failed takeover).
The change-of-control test, however, looks merely to whether the transaction results in the
emergence of a single shareholder capable of controlling management, not whether the two corporations
or their management teams are truly equal. See QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 43 (holding that sale to a
controlling stockholder with power to alter the long-term strategic alliance of the company amounted to
a change of control).
19. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 1989)
(finding that the management team’s financial interest in winning the auction and its domination of the
nominally independent board contaminated the sale process); In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41
A.3d 432, 440–42 (Del. Ch. 2012) (finding that an investment bank had a conflict of interest); In re Del
Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., No. 6027-VCL, 2011 WL 6008590, ¶¶ 2–3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 2011)
(finding that an investment bank had a conflict of interest); In re The Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926
A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007) (finding that the interest of the founding family in remaining in management
may have caused the target to prefer a private equity bidder).
20. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176 (noting that the repeated bids may have been rebuffed “in part based
on Mr. Bergerac’s strong personal antipathy to Mr. Perelman”); id. at 178 (“One director later reported
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Revlon is not the only Delaware case relevant to M&A practice. It speaks
principally to deals involving unaffiliated third-party buyers. Board duties in
transactions with a controlling shareholder are derived from another line of
cases.21 Nor is Revlon the only case setting forth expectations of boards in
connection with third-party bids. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum establishes
limitations on a board’s ability to defend its projects from unsolicited bids.22 A
line of cases from Smith v. Van Gorkom outlines further standards of conduct in
deals with third-party buyers.23
Nevertheless, Revlon remains the central case addressing third-party deals.
Revlon drives judicial analyses of defensive devices, with the applicability of
Revlon duties typically determining the outcome.24 Likewise, in contrast to other
cases that clarify details—requiring, for example, a fairness opinion or a
fiduciary out25—Revlon frames the big picture, outlining the basic rules for
(at the October 12 meeting) a ‘deluge’ of telephone calls from irate noteholders, and on October 10 the
Wall Street Journal reported threats of litigation by these creditors.”).
21. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711–15 (Del. 1983) (en banc) (holding that the
standard of “entire fairness” applies to controlling shareholder deals); see also Kahn v. M & F
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (en banc) (holding that involvement of a special
committee and a majority of the minority vote may shift the standard of review from entire fairness back
to the business judgment rule), overruled by Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018) (en
banc).
22. 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (finding that where a board may be acting in its own interests,
there is an “enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections
of the business judgment rule may be conferred”). But see Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d
586 (Del. 2010) (en banc) (holding that a board need not abandon a long-term business strategy in the
face of an unsolicited bid and may therefore keep defenses in place); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas,
Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 129 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“[A] board cannot be forced into Revlon mode any time a hostile
bidder makes a tender offer that is at a premium to market value.”).
23. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (en banc), overruled in part by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695
(Del. 2009) (en banc). Van Gorkom stands for the proposition that a board must be “fully informed”
when it engages in a sale process. 488 A.2d at 890; see also id. at 873 (“[A] director has a duty . . . to
act in an informed and deliberate manner in determining whether to approve an agreement of merger
before submitting the proposal to the stockholders.”). This principle also animates later cases holding
that a board cannot preclude itself from considering intervening bids, because doing so would render it
uninformed at the time that it submits the transaction to shareholders for their approval. See Omnicare,
Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938–39 (Del. 2003) (en banc) (holding that “[t]he
stockholders of a Delaware corporation are entitled to rely upon the board to discharge its fiduciary
duties at all times” and therefore that “[t]he NCS board was required to contract for an effective fiduciary
out clause to exercise its continuing fiduciary responsibilities to the minority stockholders”); see also
Sean J. Griffith, The Omnipresent Specter of Omnicare, 38 J. CORP. L. 753, 780–85 (2013) (critiquing
this line of cases).
24. See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder
Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 284 (2001) (finding after empirical
study that courts enjoined defensive devices under Unocal almost exclusively when Revlon also
applied).
25. The fairness opinion “requirement” is commonly associated with Van Gorkom, while the
fiduciary out requirement is a legacy of Omnicare. See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM.
U. L. REV. 1557, 1570–71 (2006) (detailing how Van Gorkom imposed a de facto rule requiring target
boards of Delaware companies to obtain fairness opinions); Griffith, supra note 23, at 754 (“[Omnicare]
had immediate and wide-ranging implications . . . for transactional practice, effectively requiring a
fiduciary out in every merger agreement.”).
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selling a company. Revlon answers whether the parties can negotiate on an
exclusive basis, when other bidders must be invited to join the process, and how
bidding may be brought to a close. Furthermore, although Revlon is perhaps most
applicable to sales processes, like the one in the case itself, in which an
intervening bidder seeks an injunction to stop an unfair sale process, it is not
limited to that context. Instead, the animating principle of Revlon duties guides
boards and transaction planners without regard to whether an intervening bidder
arises to challenge their deal.26
Revlon eventually spread to corporate law jurisdictions beyond Delaware.27
Seventeen states have decided cases involving Revlon duties. Of these, five states
(North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin) rejected Revlon
from the outset,28 and three other states (Indiana, Nevada, and New York)
ultimately rejected Revlon by reversing earlier decisions holding that Revlon
duties applied.29 By contrast, Maryland recognized the Revlon doctrine after
reversing an earlier case that had rejected it.30 Hence, by 2003, of the seventeen
states to have expressly considered it, the Revlon doctrine had been adopted into
the law of nine states (California, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, and New Hampshire).31
B. The Fall of Revlon?
Revlon’s breadth, however, eventually fueled a crisis in shareholder
litigation. Because individual shareholders can sue to enforce Revlon duties
against allegedly deficient boards in the absence of an intervening bidder,
plaintiffs’ lawyers learned to recruit a shareholder plaintiff to sue in virtually

26. See generally Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L.
681 (2013) (detailing the various merger agreement provisions companies negotiate under the shadow
of Revlon).
27. See generally Matthew D. Cain et al., Do Takeover Laws Matter? Evidence from Five
Decades of Hostile Takeovers, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 464 (2017) (evaluating the relationship between hostile
takeovers and takeover laws from 1965 to 2014).
28. See id. at 469–70.
29. See id. Indiana rejected Revlon as inconsistent with its non-shareholder constituency statute.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971,
993–94 (1992) (discussing such statutes in relation to Revlon and describing the Indiana statute as an
express repudiation of Revlon). Interestingly, roughly half of the states that have adopted Revlon into
their law also have non-shareholder constituency statutes (Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Minnesota,
and Missouri). In spite of the apparent incongruity, such statutes may not be inconsistent with Revlon
because all make the consideration of other constituency interests optional. See George A. Mocsary,
Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1319, 1359–62 (describing how most of these
statutes permit boards to consider non-shareholder interests so long as “long-term shareholder wealth is
the ultimate goal”).
30. See Cain et al., supra note 27, at 469–70.
31. See id. This data was compiled from Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law,
95 VA. L. REV. 1973, 2042–46 (2009), and updated by hand. These articles document the position of
states on Revlon, taking into account federal courts that have weighed in on the question.
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every M&A transaction.32 Eventually, 85%–95% of all merger transactions
valued over $100 million attracted at least one shareholder suit, typically filed as
a class action.33 Complaints began by invoking Revlon to challenge the merger
process, only to be amended once the provision proxy statement was released to
allege disclosure deficiencies as well.34 Appending disclosure claims to the core
Revlon claims both opened a door to expedited discovery and cleared a path to
settlement.35 Taking into account the cost of discovery and the risk involved in
winning a motion to dismiss under tight time constraints, defendants chose to
settle for supplemental disclosures and, of course, attorneys’ fees.36 Disclosure
settlements thus became the principal route out of Revlon claims.37 But the ease
of settlement only encouraged further filings until Revlon claims and disclosure

32. On the recruitment of plaintiffs, see Sean J. Griffith, Innovation in Disclosure-Based
Shareholder Suits, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 927, 929–30 (2019) (describing attorney advertising,
masked as press releases of “investigations” into board conduct, designed to yield clients in merger
litigation).
33. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015 2 (Jan. 16,
2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715890
[https://perma.cc/W3ZP-WVDP] (finding that the litigation rate was between 84.9% and 94.9% from
2009 to 2015).
34. See ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (2012),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Recent-Developments-in-Shareholder-LitigationInvo [https://perma.cc/V7Z9-4QRP].
Common allegations include the deal terms not resulting from a sufficiently competitive
auction, the existence of restrictive deal protections that discouraged additional bids, or the
impact of various conflicts of interests, such as executive retention or change-of-control
payments to executives. Complaints also typically allege that a target’s board failed to
disclose sufficient information to shareholders to enable their informed vote. Insufficient
disclosure allegations have focused on information related to the sale process, the reasons for
the board’s actions, financial projections, and the financial advisors’ fairness opinions.
Id. at 1 (footnote omitted).
35. Shareholders alleging disclosure claims were virtually assured of expedited discovery
because the Delaware standard focusing on irreparable injury was met in every case by the argument
that shareholders would be irreparably harmed by voting on deals in which adequate information had
not been disclosed. See Sinchareonkul v. Fahnemann, No. 10543-VCL, 2015 WL 292314, at *1 n.1
(Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2015) (“[T]he standard for expedition, colorability, which simply implies a nonfrivolous set of issues, is even lower that [sic] the ‘conceivability’ standard applied on a motion to
dismiss.”) (quoting In re BioClinica, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 5631233, at *1 n.1
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013)); Giammargo v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 13845, 1994 WL 672698, at *2
(Del. Ch. Nov. 15, 1994) (setting forth standard for expedited discovery as a “colorable claim
and . . . a sufficient possibility of . . . irreparable injury”).
36. See generally Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015) (documenting
this pattern and testing the effect of supplemental disclosures on shareholder voting).
37. Approximately 70% of merger litigation cases settle—and almost all the rest are dismissed.
See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition
and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 477 (2015) (“[L]itigation with respect to transactions is dismissed
by a court 28.4% of the time. The other 71.6% of transaction litigations result in some type of
settlement.”). There are still a handful of cases that go to trial, but it is rare. See, e.g., In re Rural Metro
Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No.
8703-VCL, 2015 WL 5052214 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015).
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settlements accompanied virtually every deal. The dynamic clogged Delaware
courts with non-meritorious claims38 and eroded the shareholder interests the law
sought to protect.39
After experimenting with a variety of possible responses to the crisis in
merger litigation,40 the Delaware judiciary responded by resetting Revlon in two
major cases: Corwin and C&J. In Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings,41 the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a post-closing damages claim
involving a third-party merger.42 Because the shareholders had voted in favor of
the merger, the court held Revlon duties no longer applied.43 The fully-informed,
uncoerced vote of shareholders cancelled the need for judicial intervention, and
the applicable standard of review returned to the business judgment rule.44

38. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 851, 852 (2016) (stating that the problem of merger litigation “has reached crisis proportions,”
with over 90% of merger transactions resulting in lawsuits).
39. See, e.g., Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of
Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877 (2016):
The widespread availability of disclosure settlements created perverse pressures on
transactional counsel and defense counsel. Lawyers for target corporations and their
fiduciaries, financial advisors and purchasers rationally expected that much M&A litigation
can be resolved by means of a disclosure settlement. This knowledge lessened the influence
of transactional counsel to uncover or police conflicts of interest while a sale process or
transaction is pending and to ensure the prompt, full disclosure of material facts. When
litigation began, defense counsel were incentivized to devote their talents to drafting
supplemental disclosures amenable to a negotiated resolution, and guiding litigation along a
path of least judicial oversight. Successful merits-based litigation by plaintiffs’ counsel
empowers transactional counsel to avoid, police, and disclose conflicts of interest. Disclosure
settlements do not.
Id. at 882–83.
40. See, e.g., ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558–60 (Del. 2014) (en
banc) (offering fee-shifting provisions as a potential response to the problem of non-meritorious
litigation); Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 953 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(offering forum-selection as a way of dealing with non-meritorious suits filed in other jurisdictions).
However, the legislature quickly reversed the judiciary on fee-shifting, and defendants proved reluctant
to use forum-selection to avoid disclosure settlements. See Dan Awrey et al., Resolving the Crisis in
U.S. Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine, 35 YALE J.
REG. 1, 16–20 (2018) (discussing failed attempts to respond to the crisis in merger litigation).
41. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) (en banc).
42. Although much of the dispute in the Court of Chancery was over whether the buyer should
be treated as a controlling shareholder, the case was decided as if it were a third-party merger. Id. at
306–08. The logic of the opinion has since been extended to tender offers. See, e.g., In re Volcano Corp.
Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 738 (Del. Ch. 2016) (applying business judgment review where
“disinterested, uncoerced, fully informed stockholders tendered a majority of the [target company’s]
outstanding shares into the Tender Offer”).
43. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 306 (“[W]e find that the Chancellor was correct in finding that the
voluntary judgment of the disinterested stockholders to approve the merger invoked the business
judgment rule standard of review and that the plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed.”).
44. Id. at 308 (holding that an “uncoerced, informed stockholder vote is outcome-determinative,
even if Revlon applied to the merger”).
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Revlon, in other words, did not apply: the shareholder vote substituted for
judicial scrutiny.45
At first glance, Corwin may not seem like much of a departure. It followed
recent Delaware cases in substituting transaction procedures, notably voting for
heightened judicial scrutiny.46 Moreover, it was a damages case, a context in
which Delaware judges had applied Revlon grudgingly, if at all.47
However, the meaning of Corwin becomes clear when it is paired with the
Delaware Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of
Miami General Employees’ and Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust.48 This
case held that transactions should generally not be enjoined in the absence of an
alternative bidder.49 Like Corwin, C&J follows longstanding Delaware
practice.50 Considered in tandem, however, the decisions seem to prune Revlon
duties back substantially. Corwin clarifies that Revlon is generally available only
for injunctions, not damages. C&J clarifies that for an injunction to issue, an
intervening bidder must have arisen. Together, the cases seem to pare Revlon
back to its original factual context: an intervening bidder seeking an injunction
against board conduct in a competitive bidding situation. But Corwin and C&J
would seem to eliminate what one influential jurist has referred to as “nonRevlon, Revlon suits”—that is, cases that involve a third-party deal for cash and
thereby invoke Revlon duties, but, unlike Revlon itself, do not involve an

45. The goal of substituting the vote for judicial scrutiny was expressly announced in the
decision itself:
[W]hen a transaction is not subject to the entire fairness standard, the long-standing policy of
our law has been to avoid the uncertainties and costs of judicial second-guessing when the
disinterested stockholders have had the free and informed chance to decide on the economic
merits of a transaction for themselves.
Id. at 312–13.
46. See, e.g., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (en banc) (holding
that the business judgment review standard applied to a merger conditioned upon “the uncoerced,
informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders”), overruled by Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195
A.3d 754 (Del. 2018) (en banc); see also J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on
Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1443 (2014) (arguing that only in the absence of
“an independent, disinterested, and sufficiently informed decision maker” will the court apply stringent
review).
47. See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (en banc) (denying a
damages claim by finding that a board of directors had acted in good faith in spite of not having
conducted a market check); see also Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312 (arguing that enhanced scrutiny was
designed for injunctions, not damages).
48. 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014) (en banc).
49. Id. at 1053 (“It is too often forgotten that Revlon, and later cases like QVC, primarily
involved board resistance to a competing bid after the board had agreed to a change of control . . . .”)
(footnote omitted).
50. Delaware courts have long been reluctant to issue injunctions in single-bidder deals for fear
of leaving shareholders with no transaction at all. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d
432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Although a reasonable mind might debate the tactical choices made by the
El Paso Board, these choices would provide little basis for enjoining a third-party merger approved by
a board overwhelmingly comprised of independent directors, many of whom have substantial industry
experience.”).
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intervening bidder pursuing an injunction.51 After Corwin and C&J, Revlon
duties may no longer apply to these cases.
Finally, it is worth noting that Corwin and C&J may not ultimately deserve
the credit for stemming the tide of merger litigation in Delaware. The credit for
that may go to the Court of Chancery’s 2016 holding in In re Trulia Stockholder
Litigation which raised the bar for attorneys seeking to collect fees from
disclosure settlements.52 Nevertheless, Corwin and C&J do seem to reflect a shift
in the meaning of Revlon and, therefore, board duties in third-party deals.
Whether the shift is a return to the original meaning of the case or a retreat from
it is a subject for scholarly debate, which we discuss in the next Section.
C. Revlon’s Place in Corporate Law Theory
There are literally hundreds of law review articles on Revlon.53 An early
wave of scholarly commentary discussed whether boards ought to be able to
defend themselves against bidders at all and, if so, under what circumstances and
to what extent.54 Revlon settled some of these questions by suggesting that there
were limits to boards’ authority to employ takeover defenses in at least some
situations. Scholarly commentators then turned to the task of articulating whether
and when these limits to board authority should apply and to justifying them
according to a larger theory of corporate law. Our review of Revlon’s place in
51. See KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 203 A.3d 738, 759 (Del. 2019) (describing
“third-party, non-conflicted mergers and acquisitions governed by Revlon” as “non-Revlon, Revlon
suits”). In a footnote, the court clarified further:
Unlike in Revlon, where the board had resisted selling (and especially selling to a specific
bidder), the fact scenario in these multiforum cases typically involved boards actively selling
the corporation and seeking out buyers. The plaintiffs in these cases did not in reality seek
relief for the class or to stop the deal. Instead, they used the costs and uncertainty of having
suits in several forums at once to extract “disclosure-only” settlements resulting in the class
getting the same economic deal supposedly being challenged, but with extra disclosures.
Although these disclosures typically provided the class with nothing of substance, the
plaintiffs’ lawyers got a fee and the defendants a release from further exposure.
Id. at 759 n.97 (citation omitted). An alternative view, however, is that judicial protection is most needed
by shareholders in single-bidder transactions, in which there is no intervening bidder to threaten the
board’s favored transaction.
52. See 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016) (holding that supplemental disclosures provide no
compensable benefit unless they correct “a plainly material misrepresentation or omission”).
53. See supra note 4.
54. For some of the major first-generation articles on Revlon, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986) (arguing
that managerial passivity in the face of a hostile takeover is unlikely because takeovers intensify a
fundamental tension between managers’ and shareholders’ risk preferences); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (proposing a rule of managerial passivity to control resistance by corporate
managers to premium tender offers); Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments:
Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982) (discussing how shark
repellent amendments prevent shareholders from receiving maximum value and insulate incumbent
management); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982) (making the case that facilitating competing bids benefits target
shareholders and society).
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corporate law theory therefore focuses on the latter wave of scholarly
commentary more relevant to the questions we address in this Article. This
Section takes up the question of how Revlon fits within broader theories of
corporate law and what those theories reveal about whether recent movements
in the doctrine amount to a return or a retreat.
Mainstream corporate law theory focuses fundamentally on the principal–
agent problem.55 One such agency cost is that managers will divert wealth from
shareholders unless something stops them.56 The law is part of what stops them.
Theft is illegal, and outright self-dealing is a breach of fiduciary duty. But
markets are also part of what stops managers from taking advantage of
shareholders. Firms whose managers divert all free cash flow to themselves may
find themselves unable to compete in product, labor, and capital markets. The
most important market for constraining managerial agency costs, however, may
be the market for corporate control.57
Corporate law theory also posits that if equity markets are efficient, the
value of a corporate share reflects the degree to which management diverts
shareholder wealth. This creates an opportunity to create value through
acquisition. If an inefficiently run company can be taken over, the amount of
shareholder wealth presently being diverted to management can be reallocated
between the shareholders and the bidder. Everyone benefits, except for
incumbent managers.58
This market for corporate control affects managerial behavior in at least
two significant ways. Recognizing that they have much to lose from takeovers,
managers can be expected to manage efficiently and to divert less wealth from
shareholders in order to avoid attracting the attention of a bidder. They may also
adopt takeover defenses. The pattern of the law is to allow managers to adopt
takeover defenses, perhaps because other market forces (labor markets, product
markets, capital markets) still constrain them. But courts are less deferential to
defensive measures when the board has put the company up for sale—that is, in
the incumbent management’s last period of play.

55. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288, 288 (1980) (“Economists have long been concerned with the incentive problems that arise when
decision making in a firm is the province of managers who are not the firm’s security holders.”).
56. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (explaining that if agents are
utility maximizers, “there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests
of the principal”).
57. The insight goes back to Professor Henry Manne. See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965). See also Coffee, supra note
54; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54; Gilson, supra note 54; Bebchuk, supra note 54.
58. See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 842 (1981) (“Selling shareholders receive more for
their stock than its value under previous management; new management receives an entrepreneurial
reward through the increased value of acquired shares; and society benefits from more efficiently used
resources.”).
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In game theory, the last period is the moment when the cooperative
dynamics that had guided player conduct in prior rounds of a repeated game
predictably break down.59 Anticipating that the game will end, players are no
longer constrained by the fear that their opponent will retaliate in a future round
and are motivated to extract as much as possible before the game ends. The sale
of a company presents a last-period scenario, in which the ordinary constraints
of product, labor, and capital markets no longer limit managerial agency costs.60
If managers can insulate their favored transaction from being challenged by
intervening bidders, the market for corporate control will likewise not prevent
them from diverting wealth from shareholders to themselves.
Revlon responds to precisely this last-period problem. The increase in
judicial scrutiny and the reluctance to allow defensive devices when Revlon
duties apply reflects a legal realization of the dangers inherent in the last-period
scenario.61 Revlon ensures that management cannot extract rents in the last
period by imposing judicial supervision. Following the logic elaborated above,
if a manager agrees to a sub-optimal bid in pursuit of his or her own interests, it
increases the possibility of an intervening bid, which will have the effect of
reallocating the rents extracted, in part, to shareholders.62 Revlon calls on courts
to be on guard against this diversion of shareholder wealth, thereby guaranteeing
the operation of some constraint on managers when the company is sold. Thus,
from the perspective of corporate law theory, Revlon responds to the last-period
problem.
Whether Revlon solves the agency problem it addresses, however, is
disputed. Corporate law commentators have frequently challenged Revlon for
doing too much or too little. One line of commentary asserts that the enhanced
judicial scrutiny triggered by Revlon has been confined too narrowly. Insofar as
Revlon responds to a board conflict, the same conflict often exists regardless of
the form of consideration or whether the transaction involves a controlling
shareholder.63 The CEO and top managers are often replaced (and thus face lastperiod incentives) regardless of whether the transaction form qualifies for

59. See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 110 (1991) (showing that in
repeated games, players “condition their actions on the way their opponents played in previous
periods”).
60. See Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1899, 1937 (2003).
61. Opinions of the Delaware Court of Chancery have explicitly recognized the last-period
problem inherent in M&A. See, e.g., Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 458 (Del. Ch.
2011) (“Final stage transactions for stockholders provide another situation where enhanced scrutiny
applies” because they “give rise to what economists refer to as the last period problem.”).
62. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
63. J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of Review: Why it’s True and What it Means, 19
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. LAW 5, 7 (2013) (“[C]onflicts exist regardless of the form of consideration
or whether the post-merger entity would have a controlling stockholder.”).
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enhanced scrutiny under Revlon.64 In recognition of this eventuality, managers
may negotiate for either increased severance payments or for continued control
in the combined entity, trading off merger consideration to receive them.65 In
either case, wealth is diverted from shareholders to managers. If Revlon does not
apply to such transactions, managers may be unconstrained in diverting
shareholder wealth to themselves.
Another perspective is that deals outside of the traditional change-ofcontrol paradigm do not raise the same problems because the post-acquisition
entity remains diffusely held and therefore subject to acquisition itself. In this
way, the final period has not come because the company still can be sold, and if
it is sold, the premium will go to the public stockholders.66
Critics of this view have pointed out that there is no rule limiting
shareholders to a single control premium.67 In the words of then-Vice Chancellor
Leo Strine, any time a control premium is paid, target shareholders:
[W]ould rightly be worried about whether the current merger
represented an unfair transfer of wealth from the [target] stockholders
to the [acquiring] stockholders. . . . [T]he fairness of the exchange ratio
would be critical to the [target] stockholders because it fixes . . . their
share of any future control premium.68
Perhaps, then, enhanced scrutiny should apply any time the board
negotiates for a deal premium — regardless of whether the combined company
can later be sold. In calling for change along these lines, Vice Chancellor J.
Travis Laster has urged the Delaware Supreme Court to recognize Revlon as a
form of enhanced scrutiny that “applies to negotiated acquisitions, regardless of
the form of consideration.”69 Following similar logic, the Vice Chancellor and
an academic co-author have also advocated expanding enhanced scrutiny to the
buy-side of acquisitions as well.70

64. See Jay C. Hartzell et al., What’s in it for Me? CEOs Whose Firms are Acquired, REV. FIN.
STUD., Spring 2004, at 37 (studying CEO turnover in the wake of acquisitions).
65. Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from “Mergers of
Equals,” 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 60, 96–98 (2004) (finding evidence that target CEOs trade premium for
continued control).
66. See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some
Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 881 (2003) (examining
different explanations for premiums in stock-for-stock acquisitions of publicly held corporations and
arguing that the similar positions of acquirer shareholders and target shareholders in such transactions
justifies more similar judicial and legislative treatment).
67. See, e.g., Laster, supra note 63, at 41 (“[T]here is no corporate law limit of one premium per
stockholder.”).
68. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock–for–Stock
Merger Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW. 919, 930 (2001).
69. Laster, supra note 63, at 53.
70. See Afra Afsharipour & J. Travis Laster, Enhanced Scrutiny on the Buy-Side, 53 GA. L.
REV. 443, 488–93 (2019) (arguing that enhanced scrutiny of buy-side decisions would induce more
frequent buy-side stockholder votes).
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Another line of commentary on Revlon argues that it ought not to be
interpreted too broadly, and that it should instead be confined to the existing
doctrinal paradigm.71 As interpreted by Professor Stephen Bainbridge, Revlon
ought not to be understood as a response to a pervasive last-period problem but
rather as a judicial compromise between board authority and accountability.72 To
Bainbridge, enhanced scrutiny does not serve principally to align managers with
shareholders but rather to ensure that the board can be trusted as a locus of
authority independent of management in the takeover context.73 When it can,
Bainbridge argues, courts defer.74
From this perspective, limiting Revlon to change-of-control transactions
makes sense and its scope ought not be expanded. Provided there is no conflict
of interest, the share of gains between targets and acquirers when both companies
are public ought to be a matter of indifference to diversified shareholders.75
When companies are taken private, however, diversified shareholders are not on
both sides and therefore not indifferent to the division of gains.76 Likewise,
controlling shareholder deals present situations in which the controller may
extract private benefits at the expense of public shareholders.77 In either
situation, target shareholders are especially concerned with the allocation of
gains, and these are precisely the situations to which Revlon traditionally
applies.78 According to this view, any further expansion of Revlon is

71. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3277 (2013) (arguing for a conflict of interest-based approach to invoking Revlon).
72. Id. at 3313 (“[T]he search for conflicted interests reflects the Delaware courts’ solution to
the irreconcilable tension between authority and accountability.”).
73. Id. (describing judicial enquiry into whether the board has functioned “as a separate
institution independent from and superior to the firm’s managers” as involving review of “the role
actually played by the board, especially the outside directors, the extent to which they were supplied
with all relevant information and independent advisors, and the extent to which they were insulated from
management influence”).
74. Id. (noting that if the board passes this heightened analysis “respect-for-authority values will
require the court to defer to the board’s substantive decisions. The board has legitimate authority in the
takeover context, just as it has in proxy contests and a host of other decisions that nominally appear to
belong to the shareholders.”).
75. Id. at 3335 (“[S]o long as acquisitions of publicly held corporations are conducted by other
publicly held corporations, diversified shareholders will be indifferent as to the allocations of gains
between the parties. In turn, those shareholders also will be indifferent as to the form of consideration.”)
(footnote omitted).
76. See id. (“[I]f the transaction results in a privately held entity, a diversified shareholder cannot
be on both sides of the transaction.”).
77. Id. (“If the post-transaction entity remains publicly held, but will be dominated by a
controlling shareholder, there is a substantial risk that the control shareholder will be able to extract nonpro rata benefits in the future and get a sweetheart deal from target directors in the initial acquisition.”).
78. Id.
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unwarranted, on either the sell side or the buy side.79 Others go still further,
arguing that Revlon ought to be limited to its facts or abandoned altogether.80
Finally, another line of scholarly commentary argues that Revlon has in fact
withered away to near meaninglessness. Professors Lyman Johnson and Robert
Ricca, for example, focus on remedies to argue that Revlon is not meaningful in
the damages context because, at least since Lyondell, plaintiffs have an
impossible case to prove.81 Even in the context of equitable relief, Johnson and
Ricca argue, Revlon is essentially meaningless because transactions are so rarely
enjoined.82 As a result, they conclude, the importance of Revlon in corporate law
doctrine is vastly overstated.83
After Corwin, many corporate law commentators have come to agree that
Revlon has lost its bite. For example, Professor Iman Anabtawi argues that
allowing shareholder ratification to substitute for enhanced scrutiny constitutes
a fundamental shift in Delaware jurisprudence which may reduce deal litigation
but also deprive shareholders of important protections.84 Likewise, although
Professor Charles Korsmo sees the outcome in Corwin as largely foreordained
by MFW, he laments its potential effect on M&A transactions.85 Numerous other
corporate law commentators have expressed similar unease with Corwin.86

79. Id. at 3337 (“[T]he Delaware courts should not go further down the road toward applying a
substantive reasonableness analysis to all corporate acquisitions.”).
80. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Removing Revlon, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1488
(2013) (arguing that “because there is no sensible policy that one can articulate for Revlon beyond the
narrow confines of the original decision” the doctrine ought to be limited to “its original foundation of
choosing between two all-cash bids”); see also Franklin A. Gevurtz, Saying Yes: Reviewing Board
Decisions to Sell or Merge the Corporation, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 437 (2017) (arguing that the
explosion in merger litigation signals a need to return Revlon to a narrower factual context).
81. Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167,
208–09 (2014) (noting that after Lyondell, plaintiffs must prove a breach of good faith—that is, that
directors intentionally acted contrary to fiduciary duty—in order to recover damages, and that proving
this is virtually impossible).
82. Id. at 173.
83. Id. at 173–74 (“[T]he stakes are far smaller than many scholars, judges, and lawyers may
fully appreciate . . . .”).
84. Iman Anabtawi, The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A Jurisprudence, 43
DEL. J. CORP. L. 161 (2019).
85. Korsmo, supra note 11, at 59–60 (“Corwin follows directly from MFW. Once you hold that
the procedural trappings of an arm’s-length deal entitle a majority stockholder squeeze-out to business
judgment rule deference, it would be strange indeed to deny such deference to an actual arm’s-length
deal.”).
86. See Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of Successful
Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623, 643–45 (2017) (identifying how the
doctrinal limitation of a fully informed stockholder vote falls short of providing adequate protections in
practice); Matthew Schoenfeld, From Corwin to Dell: The Cost of Turning a Blind Eye (Feb. 12, 2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3122511
[https://perma.cc/LK6N-CWJ9 ] (predicting that Corwin and its progeny will result in faster CEO pay
growth and more industry-specific, concentrated M&A, which will contribute to lower competition,
wage stagnation, and inequality); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Cracking the Corwin Conundrum and Other
Mysteries Regarding Shareholder Approval of Mergers and Acquisitions 7–8 (Sept. 19, 2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3252264
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Amid all of this debate, however, one question lingers: what effect can
Revlon be shown to have had on M&A transactions? Each of the positions in this
debate assumes that Revlon has (or had) an important effect on M&A. But did
it? What does the empirical evidence show? In the Section that follows, we
subject Revlon to empirical analysis.
II.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Evidence bearing on whether Revlon matters should appear in transactions
subject to the doctrine, also known as “Revlon deals.” As described above, when
Revlon applies, transaction planners must follow a sale process reasonably
designed to maximize shareholder value.87 Because this is a higher standard of
judicial review than the typical standard of review (i.e., the business judgment
rule), if Revlon matters we predict that transactions subject to Revlon will differ
from transactions to which the doctrine does not apply. Such a difference, if it
exists, could result either from transaction planners following different sale
processes for their Revlon deals or, alternatively, from the greater potential for
the involvement of intervening bidders in Revlon deals.
In this Section, we first develop a set of hypotheses to test empirically
whether Revlon matters. Next, we describe the data set against which we will test
our hypotheses. Third, we offer descriptive statistics of the transactions in our
data set. Fourth and finally, we report the results of our empirical analysis.
A. Hypothesis Development
How will Revlon deals differ from non-Revlon deals? We develop three
core hypotheses relating to the length and intensity of negotiations, the number
of bidders involved, and the size of the premium paid in the deal. Moreover,
insofar as it is Revlon that matters and not something else, any difference in these
core predictions must be driven by the doctrine and not by something else, such
as the type of deal (for example, MOE or non-MOE) or the type of buyer (for
example, private equity or other financial buyers versus strategic bidders).
First, we observe that a sale process reasonably designed to maximize
shareholder value may imply intensive negotiations. A seller seeking to
maximize the value of an asset ordinarily does not accept the first offer without
seeking to negotiate further.88 Instead, a series of offers and counter-offers may
[https://perma.cc/JT25-PLBT] (arguing that courts must understand shareholder approval in light of
shareholders’ limited choices when voting on proposed mergers). But see Brandon Mordue, The Revlon
Divergence: Evolution of Judicial Review of Merger Litigation, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 531, 535, 575–
76 (2018) (referring to Corwin as one of three separate lines of cases that have altered the judicial review
of merger litigation by Delaware courts and concluding that Corwin encourages disclosure to
stockholders while discouraging meritless litigation).
87. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
88. This concept is embedded in basic negotiation theory. See generally STUART DIAMOND,
GETTING MORE: HOW YOU CAN NEGOTIATE TO SUCCEED IN WORK AND LIFE (2010).
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develop. Even when the parties agree on certain features of the transaction, they
may continue to negotiate other terms, such as price, over a protracted period of
time. The intensity of negotiations may thus be measured in two ways: by the
number of rounds of bidding or by the number of days over which negotiations
occur. These lead to our first set of hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1A: Revlon deals will involve more rounds of
bidding than non-Revlon deals.
• Hypothesis 1B: Revlon deals will involve more days of
negotiations than non-Revlon deals.
Because each of these relate fundamentally to the intensity of negotiations, we
will occasionally refer to Hypothesis 1A and Hypothesis 1B collectively as our
“negotiation process” hypotheses.
Second, a sale process reasonably designed to maximize shareholder value
may also engage a larger number of bidders. Rather than negotiating privately, a
seller may decide to sell the company through a public auction process. Auction
processes may be designed differently—with one or several rounds of bidding.
Because multiple rounds of bidding are captured by Hypothesis 1A, above, we
focus here on the number of bidders.
• Hypothesis 2: Revlon deals will involve more bidders than nonRevlon deals.
If Hypothesis 2 is true, it may be that transaction planners designed a multibidder auction from the outset or, alternatively, that the announcement of a
negotiated transaction prompted the intervention of outside bidders. Either of
these situations can be related to Revlon, since a multi-bidder auction may be
selected ex ante as the best way to maximize shareholder value and the
consideration of intervening bids ex post may be required in order to maximize
shareholder value.
Third, we hypothesize that transactions designed to maximize shareholder
wealth will ultimately result in higher deal premiums. Our negotiation process
hypotheses along with our hypothesis focusing on additional bidders all focus on
means—that is, how the transaction process is designed to maximize shareholder
wealth. But we can also focus on the ends. Did the transaction process result in
greater wealth for shareholders? The clearest way to see this is in the premium
offered in the deal—the extent to which the deal price exceeded the preannouncement share price.
• Hypothesis 3: Revlon deals will have higher premiums than
non-Revlon deals.
In other words, greater scrutiny of the transaction process should result in
transactions at higher premiums.
If Revlon matters, we would predict that all of the above hypotheses are
true. Additionally, in order to demonstrate that it is Revlon that matters and not
unrelated features of the transactional environment, our predictions must hold
across time periods and through a series of controls relating to deal
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characteristics. We undertake this analysis in Part II.D, below. But first, we
explain how we developed our sample set and provide descriptive characteristics
of the transactions in the sample.
B. Sample Set
To assemble data for analysis, we started with the transactions in the
FactSet MergerMetrics database. These transactions were announced during the
time period 2003 through 2017 and meet all of the following criteria: (1) the
target is a publicly traded U.S. firm, (2) the deal size is at least $100 million, (3)
the offer price is at least $5 per share, and (4) a merger agreement is signed and
publicly disclosed through a filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).89 Roughly 5% of the transactions were ultimately
withdrawn. We manually reviewed approximately 70% of the deal proxy
statements to record information disclosed in the Background of the Merger
sections, including the number of bidders, bidding rounds, time period of
negotiations, and bid prices during the rounds.90 The remaining 30% of
transactions were coded by a machine learning algorithm that was trained on the
manually coded observations.
The result is a data set containing 1,913 unique transactions over a fifteenyear period. Within this sample, we used two parameters to distinguish which
transactions were within Revlon. First, the target company must have been
incorporated in a state that had adopted Revlon.91 Second, the consideration paid
in the transaction must have consisted of at least 50% cash.92 Applying these
parameters to our sample set, we found 1,167 transactions that were subject to
the Revlon standard, and 553 that were not. We also found 193 transactions to
which Revlon might have applied due to the form of consideration but which
involved targets incorporated in a state without any Revlon decision. Given this
ambiguity, we coded our primary Revlon variable as being equal to one for deals
subject to Revlon, negative one for deals not subject to Revlon, and zero for the
193 transactions in states without a resolution of the Revlon status.

89. This criteria is similar to that utilized in prior studies. See Cain & Solomon, A Great Game,
supra note 37.
90. The time period of negotiations was measured as the difference in days between the first
offer date and the merger agreement date.
91. For a discussion of the variation between states in adopting the Revlon standard, see supra
notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
92. This parameter is based on prior case law, which generally sets Revlon applicable at these
thresholds. See In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076
(Del. Ch. May 20, 2011, revised May 24, 2011) (stating that Revlon would likely apply if the
consideration mix was at least 50% cash); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25
(Del. Ch. 1999) (holding Revlon applies where 62% of consideration was cash), aff’d sub nom. Walker
v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000) (mem.).
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C. Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1 we report the distributions of key variables in our sample.93
Variables relating to merger characteristics are reported in Panel A, and variables
relating to target company characteristics are reported in Panel B.94
Table 1: Transaction and Party Characteristics
Panel A: Merger Characteristics
N

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

25th %

Median

75th %

Max

# of
Bidding
Rounds

1,897

5.4

3.6

1

3

5

7

30

Negotiation
Days

1,825

131.5

141.3

0

39

78

169

719

Log
Negotiation
Days

1,873

4.4

1.3

0

3.7

4.4

5.2

10.6

Multiple
Bidders
Indicator

1,913

0.55

0.5

0

0

1

1

1

Private
Equity /
LBO

1,913

0.18

0.39

0

0

0

0

1

Offer
Premium

1,819

0.34

0.26

-0.59

0.18

0.29

0.44

1.75

93. In the table, we trim outliers of the following variables (resulting in the number of
observations set to missing values): negotiation periods greater than two years (N=75), offer premiums
over 200% (N=17), debt-to-equity ratios below zero or greater than fifty (N=53), and market-to-book
ratios below zero or greater than fifty (N=57).
94. # of Bidding Rounds is the number of offers and counteroffers made by any parties involved
in the negotiation process, Negotiation Days is the number of days between the first bid date and the
merger agreement signing date (typically prior to any public announcement of the deal), Multiple
Bidders Indicator equals one if more than one party bids for a target and zero for single bidder
negotiations, Private Equity / LBO equals one if the acquirer is a private equity firm or the transaction
is a leveraged buyout involving at least one private equity firm and zero for strategic transactions (as
coded by MergerMetrics), and Offer Premium is the premium of the final offer price relative to the
target’s stock price 30 days before the public merger announcement. Log Total Assets is the log of the
book value of total assets, Net Loss Indicator equals one if the company had negative net income in the
fiscal year and zero otherwise, Market-to-Book is the market value of common stock at the end of the
calendar year divided by the book value of common equity, Debt-to-Equity is the book value of debt
divided by the book value of common equity, Log Sales Growth is the log of sales in the given fiscal
year divided by the prior year’s sales, and Log Age is the log of the number of years since a firm’s IPO
date.
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Panel B: Target Characteristics

Log Total
Assets
Net Loss
Indicator
Market-toBook
Debt-toEquity
Log Sales
Growth
Log Age

N

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

25th %

Median

75th %

Max

1,833

6.7

1.59

-0.27

5.53

6.7

7.68

13.84

1,833

0.25

0.43

0

0

0

1

1

1,752

2.9

3.18

0

1.37

2.08

3.25

46.97

1,770

0.9

2.28

0

0

0.3

0.98

36.65

1,809

0.09

0.3

-2.97

-0.01

0.07

0.17

3.02

1,839

2.64

0.62

0

2.2

2.64

3.09

3.74

Table 1 reveals a wide range of values for the private merger negotiation
variables. The number of bidding rounds ranges from a minimum of one to a
maximum of thirty, with a median of five. The length of the negotiation period
ranges from zero (an offer accepted within one day) to a maximum of just under
two years, with a median of seventy-eight days (roughly two and a half months).
About 55% of transactions involve multiple bidders. These unique data points
from the private merger negotiating process reveal considerable heterogeneity,
which we exploit in subsequent tests for negotiating intensity.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for key merger-related variables, broken
down by transactions subject to Revlon duties versus those not subject to the
Revlon standard. The final column reports t-statistics for differences in means
between the two groups. Panel A reports details for the full sample in all
jurisdictions while Panel B reports details only for Delaware-incorporated
targets.95 As mentioned above, within-Delaware variation in Revlon occurs
through differences in the method of payment for these mergers.
Table 2: Key Merger-Related Variables
Panel A: All Jurisdictions

# of Bidding Rounds
Negotiation Days
Log Negotiation Days
Multiple Bidders Indicator
Hostile
Private Equity / LBO
Offer Premium
Bid Increase %

Non-Revlon
Mean
N
4.69
733
118.00
711
4.19
716
0.49
746
0.04
746
0.10
746
0.29
696
12.51
678

Revlon
Mean
N
5.79
1,164
140.03
1,114
4.49
1,157
0.59
1,167
0.05
1,167
0.23
1,167
0.36
1,123
14.38
1,104

t-statistic (diff.)
6.55***
3.32***
4.75***
4.59***
0.89
8.10***
5.53***
1.16

95. Hostile is an indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer’s approach listed in
MergerMetrics is “Hostile” or “Unsolicited” and zero otherwise. Bid Increase % is the percentage
change from the initial bid to the final offer price * 100. All other variables are defined supra note 94.
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Panel B: Delaware-Incorporated Targets
Non-Revlon
Mean
N
# of Bidding Rounds
4.49
196
Negotiation Days
95.58
190
Log Negotiation Days
3.97
194
Multiple Bidders Indicator
0.32
200
Hostile
0.06
200
Private Equity / LBO
0.01
200
Offer Premium
0.27
186
Bid Increase %
16.22
172

Revlon
Mean
N
5.83
1,059
139.98
1,016
4.47
1,052
0.60
1,061
0.05
1,061
0.23
1,061
0.37
1,019
14.32
1,004

1707

t-statistic (diff.)
5.04***
4.73***
4.62***
7.66***
-0.02
16.47***
4.54***
-0.47

p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We break out Delaware and non-Delaware deals because we utilize this
distinction for our robustness tests in later models.96 For both the full sample in
Panel A and Delaware targets in Panel B, deals within Revlon have more bidding
rounds, longer negotiation periods, and a greater incidence of multiple bidders.
Revlon deals are also associated with higher final offer premiums.
The univariate differences reported in Table 2 do not appear to be driven
by differences in transaction type—that is, two-party exclusive mergers of equals
(MOEs) versus open bidding for control. If non-Revlon deals were all MOEs, for
example, we would not expect almost half of them to involve multiple bidders.
Nor would we expect them to experience significant bidding activity in terms of
the number of bidding rounds, negotiation days, bidders, and the size of the offer
premium. The fact that these non-Revlon transactions experience this type of
activity highlights that they are not predominantly MOEs as traditionally
defined.
D. Findings
In this Section, we examine whether our univariate results continue to hold
after controlling for additional variables and fixed effects. We first report our
basic empirical findings. We then subject our basic findings to a series of
robustness checks.
1. Empirical Results
We first analyze our negotiation process hypotheses. Table 3 reports results
from OLS regressions relating to Hypothesis 1A: that Revlon deals would have
more rounds of bidding. In each model, the dependent variable is the number of
bidding rounds. Column (1) reports a baseline model, Column (2) adds control
variables, Column (3) adds year fixed effects, Column (4) replaces year with
industry fixed effects, and Column (5) includes both year and industry fixed
effects.

96.

See infra Part II.D.2.a.
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Table 3: Rounds of Bidding
Dep. Var: # of
Bidding Rounds
Revlon

(1)
Base

(2)
Controls

(3)
Year F.E.

(4)
Industry F.E.

(5)
Ind. & Yr.
F.E.

0.591***
(0.000)

0.415***
(0.000)

0.307***
(0.003)

0.310***
(0.008)

0.218*
(0.055)

-0.139**

-0.216***

-0.080

-0.156**

(0.022)

(0.000)

(0.248)

(0.020)

0.554**

0.201

0.471**

0.148

(0.014)

(0.352)

(0.036)

(0.498)

-0.005

-0.022

-0.010

-0.024

(0.899)

(0.561)

(0.825)

(0.561)

0.000

0.023

-0.010

0.010

Log Total Assets
Net Loss Indicator
Market-to-Book
Debt-to-Equity

(0.995)

(0.549)

(0.826)

(0.814)

Log Sales Growth

-0.867***

-0.668**

-0.954***

-0.752***

(0.003)

(0.016)

(0.002)

(0.008)

Log Age

0.423***

0.258*

0.369**

0.232

(0.004)

(0.074)

(0.021)

(0.138)

Hostile

1.607***

1.533***

1.408***

1.369***

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

Private Equity / LBO

1.620***

1.700***

1.487***

1.563***

Constant
R2
N

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

5.170***

4.655***

5.736***

4.523***

5.500***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.0212
1,897

0.0771
1,708

0.1319
1,708

0.1598
1,700

0.2060
1,700

p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In all models shown in Table 3, Revlon deals are associated with a greater
number of bidding rounds, as predicted by Hypothesis 1A. This is consistent with
more aggressive negotiating behavior on the part of targets and their directors,
who are subject to Revlon duties and the expectation of obtaining the best offer
price for shareholders. Alternatively, it may be that Revlon deals are more likely
to attract intervening bids leading to further rounds of bidding.
As the results in Table 3 show, transactions involving private equity bidders
are highly correlated with additional rounds of bidding. This finding is consistent
with prior studies finding that private equity firms are more likely to participate
in auctions which, in turn, lend themselves to more bidding.97 But it also
highlights that sellers generally negotiate more heavily with private equity
97. See Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Do Auctions Induce a Winner’s Curse? New
Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2008); Audra L. Boone & J. Harold
Mulherin, Is There One Best Way to Sell a Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled
Sales, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2009, at 28.
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bidders. Some commentators asked whether our results were driven by the
presence or absence of private equity bidders. The continuing statistical
significance of Revlon deals even after the introduction of the private equity
variable in this and other tables demonstrates that our results are not driven by
private equity transactions.98
We test our second negotiating process hypothesis, Hypothesis 1B, in Table
4. Recall that Hypothesis 1B predicts that the negotiation periods would be
longer in Revlon cases. This may be because of the effort exerted by target
directors in obtaining higher offer prices for shareholders. Alternatively, it may
be due to delays occasioned by the need to consider intervening bids. The
dependent variable in these OLS regressions is the log of the number of days
during which the transaction was negotiated.99
Table 4: Days of Negotiations
Dep. Var: Log
Negotiation
Days
Revlon

(1)
Base

(2)
Controls

(3)
Year F.E.

(4)
Industry F.E.

(5)
Ind. & Yr. F.E.

0.193***
(0.000)

0.136***
(0.000)
-0.175***
(0.000)
0.038

0.094**
(0.012)
-0.194***
(0.000)
-0.082

0.121***
(0.005)
-0.164***
(0.000)
0.047

0.078*
(0.064)
-0.182***
(0.000)
-0.069

(0.623)
-0.028***
(0.006)
0.011
(0.428)
-0.443***

(0.287)
-0.032***
(0.002)
0.014
(0.256)
-0.341***

(0.550)
-0.034***
(0.002)
0.023
(0.115)
-0.468***

(0.385)
-0.039***
(0.000)
0.027*
(0.050)
-0.365***

(0.000)
0.164***
(0.002)
0.749***
(0.000)
0.236***

(0.001)
0.118**
(0.029)
0.720***
(0.000)
0.287***

(0.000)
0.132**
(0.025)
0.751***
(0.000)
0.188**

(0.001)
0.087
(0.137)
0.737***
(0.000)
0.242***

(0.006)
5.098***
(0.000)
0.0882
1,693

(0.001)
5.382***
(0.000)
0.1381
1,693

(0.038)
5.127***
(0.000)
0.1360
1,685

(0.006)
5.399***
(0.000)
0.1829
1,685

Log Total Assets
Net Loss
Indicator
Market-to-Book
Debt-to-Equity
Log Sales
Growth
Log Age
Hostile
Private Equity /
LBO
Constant
R2
N

4.309***
(0.000)
0.0164
1,873

p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

98. We thank Professor Elizabeth de Fontenay for pointing out this issue.
99. As in the prior table, Column (1) reports a baseline model, Column (2) adds control
variables, Column (3) adds year fixed effects, Column (4) replaces year with industry fixed effects, and
Column (5) includes both year and industry fixed effects.
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The results from Table 4 support Hypothesis 1B: Revlon transactions tend
to involve negotiations over a longer time period. The Revlon coefficients are
positive and statistically significant in all models. This finding provides evidence
that targets subject to Revlon negotiate for longer periods, implying greater
negotiation intensity.
Again, as in Table 3, sellers negotiate for a longer period with private equity
bidders, but the results are separately significant along with the Revlon variable.
The significance of both variables means that private equity transactions do not
entirely explain the significance of the Revlon variable.
Next, we turn to Hypothesis 2, which predicts more bidders in Revlon deals.
Table 5 presents results from logit models with dependent variable equal to one
for transactions involving multiple bidders and zero for transactions negotiated
exclusively with a single bidder. Note that this information was collected from
the background sections of merger proxy statements and thus includes all bidders
during private negotiations, not merely bidders who made publicly observable
competing bids after deal announcements.100

100. As in prior tables, Column (1) reports a baseline model, Column (2) adds control variables,
Column (3) adds year fixed effects, Column (4) replaces year with industry fixed effects, and Column
(5) includes both industry and year fixed effects.
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Table 5: Multiple Bidders
Dep. Var:
Multiple
Bidders (0/1)
Revlon

(1)
Base

(2)
Controls

(3)
Year F.E.

(4)
Industry F.E.

(5)
Ind. & Yr. F.E.

0.260***
(0.000)

0.144**
(0.014)
-0.179***

0.140**
(0.020)
-0.186***

0.099
(0.144)
-0.179***

0.094
(0.175)
-0.184***

(0.000)
0.112

(0.000)
0.124

(0.000)
0.098

(0.000)
0.119

(0.370)
-0.057***

(0.338)
-0.064***

(0.449)
-0.057***

(0.373)
-0.064***

(0.005)
0.014
(0.633)
-0.073

(0.003)
0.022
(0.469)
-0.125

(0.008)
0.011
(0.710)
-0.080

(0.004)
0.019
(0.548)
-0.120

(0.679)
0.215**
(0.016)
-0.171
(0.441)
0.943***

(0.502)
0.174*
(0.060)
-0.173
(0.438)
0.901***

(0.661)
0.252**
(0.012)
-0.247
(0.315)
0.991***

(0.532)
0.218**
(0.034)
-0.237
(0.338)
0.933***

(0.000)
0.794**
(0.017)
0.0456
1,723

(0.000)
0.174
(0.711)
0.0561
1,723

(0.000)
-0.068
(0.958)
0.0730
1,698

(0.000)
-0.733
(0.568)
0.0819
1,698

Log Total
Assets
Net Loss
Indicator
Market-toBook
Debt-to-Equity
Log Sales
Growth
Log Age
Hostile
Private Equity /
LBO
Constant
Pseudo R2
N

0.121**
(0.013)
0.0097
1,913

p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results reported in Table 5 support Hypothesis 2: the coefficient on
Revlon is positive and significant in Columns (1) through (3), indicating that
transactions in Revlon tend to involve multiple bidders. The coefficients remain
positive in Columns (4) and (5), but are not statistically significant when industry
fixed effects are included in the models. This finding again provides evidence
that targets subject to Revlon may search for or attract more bidders.
Finally, we test the effect of Revlon on deal outcomes. Hypothesis 3
predicts higher premiums for deals in Revlon. Table 6 reports results from OLS
regressions testing this hypothesis, with offer premium being the dependent
variable.101

101. As in prior tables, Column (1) reports a baseline model, Column (2) adds control variables,
Column (3) adds year fixed effects, Column (4) replaces year with industry fixed effects, and Column
(5) includes both industry and year fixed effects.
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Table 6: Offer Premiums
Dep. Var: Offer
Premium
Revlon

(1)
Base
0.040***
(0.000)

Log Total
Assets
Net Loss
Indicator

(2)
Controls
0.029***
(0.000)
-0.026***

(3)
Year F.E.
0.025***
(0.000)
-0.026***

(4)
Industry F.E.
0.019**
(0.014)
-0.026***

(5)
Ind. & Yr. F.E.
0.017**
(0.024)
-0.027***

(0.000)
0.094***

(0.000)
0.082***

(0.000)
0.087***

(0.000)
0.078***

(0.000)
-0.002

(0.000)
-0.001

(0.000)
-0.006***

(0.000)
-0.005**

(0.297)
-0.002
(0.565)
-0.014

(0.513)
-0.002
(0.458)
0.001

(0.008)
0.002
(0.635)
-0.006

(0.027)
0.001
(0.817)
0.007

(0.727)
0.003
(0.765)
0.082**
(0.024)
-0.080***

(0.972)
-0.003
(0.769)
0.080**
(0.028)
-0.078***

(0.883)
-0.002
(0.860)
0.088**
(0.018)
-0.069***

(0.860)
-0.008
(0.489)
0.087**
(0.019)
-0.066***

(0.000)
0.490***
(0.000)
0.0969
1,685

(0.000)
0.505***
(0.000)
0.1246
1,685

(0.000)
0.515***
(0.000)
0.1622
1,676

(0.000)
0.536***
(0.000)
0.1834
1,676

Market-toBook
Debt-to-Equity
Log Sales
Growth
Log Age
Hostile
Private Equity /
LBO
Constant
R2
N

0.322***
(0.000)
0.0193
1,819

p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results reported in Table 6 support Hypothesis 3: in all models, deals
subject to Revlon are associated with significantly higher offer premiums. The
results show that Revlon deals have offer premiums that are 1.7% to 4% higher
than non-Revlon deals. The magnitude of this difference is economically
meaningful: a $2.6 billion transaction, the average-sized deal in our sample,
would have a $41.6 million to $104 million larger deal premium if it were subject
to Revlon.
To summarize our basic empirical results, Tables 3–6 show that Revlon
transactions experience longer negotiation periods, more bidding rounds, more
incidence of multiple bidders, and higher premiums. In the next Section, we
conduct robustness tests to confirm these findings, and to determine whether our
results are driven by Delaware or the peculiarity of transactions subject to
Revlon.
2. Robustness Checks
In this Section, we subject our basic results to further robustness checks. In
particular, we are concerned that our Revlon results may be driven predominantly
by Delaware versus non-Delaware deals. We are also concerned that certain
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transaction characteristics—in particular, whether a deal is styled as a merger of
equals—might also be driving our results. We therefore devise further tests to
determine whether these variables, and not Revlon itself, drive our results.
a. Delaware Versus Non-Delaware Targets
We first tested whether Delaware deals drive our empirical findings by rerunning the model specifications of Tables 3-6 exclusively on the non-Delaware
companies in our sample. In unreported results, we found that that Revlon has no
statistically significant effect in any of these models when only applied to nonDelaware firms. Our main empirical findings shown in Part II.D.1 therefore
appear to be driven by Delaware firms. Outside of Delaware, Revlon appears to
predict nothing with regard to bidding process, number of bidders, or deal
premium. We explore the interesting implications of this non-result in Part III
below.
In order to place this non-result in further context, we ran the same tests
exclusively on Delaware companies. Table 7 reports results from the models
reported in the final column of Tables 3-6 run only on Delaware incorporated
targets. The Revlon coefficients are positive and statistically significant in each
of these four models, consistent with the results from Tables 3-6. In fact, the
statistical significance is stronger in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 than in the
final columns of Tables 5 and 6. This indicates that these findings are particularly
concentrated among Delaware firms.
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Table 7: Delaware Firms Only

Dependent Variable:
Revlon
Log Total Assets
Net Loss Indicator
Market-to-Book
Debt-to-Equity
Log Sales Growth
Log Age
Hostile
Private Equity / LBO
Constant
Industry & Year F.E.
R2
N

(1)
Number of
Bidding
Rounds
0.296*
(0.054)
-0.205**
(0.024)
-0.100
(0.695)
-0.005
(0.911)
0.020
(0.724)
-0.816**
(0.022)
0.486**
(0.017)
0.900*
(0.082)
1.707***
(0.000)
5.308***
(0.000)
Yes
0.2025
1,110

(2)
Log
Negotiation
Days
0.095*
(0.099)
-0.178***
(0.000)
-0.089
(0.333)
-0.029**
(0.012)
0.015
(0.406)
-0.385***
(0.003)
0.118
(0.125)
0.609***
(0.001)
0.234**
(0.032)
5.289***
(0.000)
Yes
0.1934
1,106

(3)

(4)

(Logit) Multiple
Bidders 0/1
0.289***
(0.005)
-0.162***
(0.003)
0.261
(0.106)
-0.055**
(0.036)
-0.034
(0.498)
-0.190
(0.453)
0.287**
(0.032)
-0.429
(0.146)
0.955***
(0.000)
-0.893
(0.564)
Yes
0.1012
1,090

Offer
Premium
0.032***
(0.005)
-0.032***
(0.000)
0.069***
(0.001)
-0.005*
(0.085)
0.001
(0.883)
0.034
(0.487)
-0.029*
(0.058)
0.086*
(0.057)
-0.080***
(0.000)
0.616***
(0.000)
Yes
0.2003
1,089

p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We conducted an additional robustness test reflected below in Table 8. This
table reports the same regressions as those in Table 7, but across the entire
sample. We included an indicator for Delaware and the interaction of Delaware
and Revlon. This allows us to evaluate whether Delaware has any further impact
on deal characteristics outside the scope of Revlon. The findings in Table 8
confirm those in Table 7: Revlon has a positive and statistically significant
impact only through interaction with Delaware companies.102

102. We note that when omitting year fixed effects, Revlon is positively and significantly related
to the length of the negotiation period across all firms.
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Table 8: All Firms with Delaware Interaction

Dependent Variable:
Revlon
Delaware
Revlon*Delaware
Log Total Assets
Net Loss Indicator
Market-to-Book
Debt-to-Equity
Log Sales Growth
Log Age
Hostile
Private Equity / LBO
Constant
Industry & Year F.E.
R2
N

(1)
Number of
Bidding
Rounds
-0.211
(0.248)
0.296
(0.198)
0.540**
(0.016)
-0.169**
(0.015)
0.124
(0.572)
-0.027
(0.517)
0.013
(0.761)
-0.775***
(0.007)
0.282*
(0.090)
1.363***
(0.005)
1.554***
(0.000)
5.166***
(0.000)
Yes
0.2096
1,700

(2)
Log
Negotiation
Days
0.093
(0.244)
-0.079
(0.377)
0.009
(0.920)
-0.178***
(0.000)
-0.064
(0.424)
-0.039***
(0.000)
0.028**
(0.043)
-0.362***
(0.001)
0.075
(0.217)
0.740***
(0.000)
0.238***
(0.007)
5.444***
(0.000)
Yes
0.1833
1,685

(3)

(4)

(Logit) Multiple
Bidders 0/1
-0.215*
(0.083)
-0.130
(0.386)
0.526***
(0.001)
-0.174***
(0.000)
0.128
(0.342)
-0.065***
(0.004)
0.023
(0.457)
-0.126
(0.511)
0.205*
(0.053)
-0.227
(0.362)
0.903***
(0.000)
-0.837
(0.512)
Yes
0.0870
1,698

Offer
Premium
0.009
(0.481)
-0.032**
(0.048)
0.026*
(0.098)
-0.025***
(0.000)
0.081***
(0.000)
-0.005**
(0.029)
0.001
(0.727)
0.008
(0.839)
-0.013
(0.291)
0.088**
(0.018)
-0.069***
(0.000)
0.548***
(0.000)
Yes
0.1862
1,676

p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Taken together, these results confirm Delaware firms drive our main
empirical results. Our findings in Table 7 are statistically significant for
Delaware companies and highly statistically significant (at the 1% level) with
respect to Hypothesis 2 (number of bidders) and Hypothesis 3 (deal premium).
Again, the persistence of this statistically significant result even after controlling
for the private equity variable shows that private equity transactions do not drive
our results.
Additionally, the non-result in other states provides a meaningful
robustness check on our results in the form of a quasi-placebo test.103 For

103. Our model set-up partially explains our differing conclusions from a contemporaneous
paper by Professor Gubler. Professor Gubler used a random sample of 290 deals from 2009–2016 to
examine the effect of Revlon on deal process. He also used an interaction term, Revlon * number of bids,
as an independent variable regressed against offer premium and found no statistical significance. He
concluded “the effect that the number of bids has on market returns and deal premia is no different in
Revlon mode than outside of Revlon mode” and therefore Revlon has no “substantive bite.” Zachary J.
Gubler, What’s the Deal with Revlon? 34 (June 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3402166 [https://perma.cc/8NQC-BBJ8]. The
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example, it has often been supposed that premiums paid in cash transactions are
generally higher than those paid in stock transactions.104 If this were the case,
however, we would expect to find higher premiums associated with our Revlon
variable without regard to state. Instead, the lack of a statistically significant
result outside of Delaware implies that the simple fact of cash consideration does
not drive our results.105
b. Non-Revlon Deals Versus Mergers-of-Equals
It is also possible that other deal characteristics drive our results. In
particular, if non-Revlon deals predominantly constitute mergers-of-equals
(MOEs)—which tend to have only one bidder, shorter negotiation windows, and
lower offer premiums—then it may be that characteristics of those deals are more
responsible for our results than Revlon. We therefore created an MOE variable,
defining it as a transaction where the two parties are within 10% of market value
at the time of the transaction announcement.106 Only twenty-three deals in our
sample qualify as MOEs by this definition. This suggests MOEs are unlikely to
drive our main empirical results. Nevertheless, we tested our key variables on
these subsamples.
Table 9 reports sample means of our variables by MOEs vs. non-MOEs.

number of bids and the deal terms themselves, however, are a joint-selection which are a product of, and
influenced by, the premium. Professor Gubler did not control for this endogeneity and joint selection
effects in his regression models.
104. This supposition appears in several papers. See, e.g., Ulrike Malmendier et al., Target
Revaluation After Failed Takeover Attempts: Cash Versus Stock, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 92 (2016); Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295, 308 (2003);
Eliezer M. Fich et al., Contractual Revisions in Compensation: Evidence from Merger Bonuses to
Target CEOs, 61 J. ACCT. & ECON. 338, 348 (2016).
105. To further test this proposition, in unreported results we run a robustness check on our
sample by dropping all deals with less than 50% cash payment and all-stock deals. This allows us to
compare deals subject to Revlon by court decision with identical deals which would be subject to Revlon
but for the fact the state of incorporation of the firm has not adopted or rejected Revlon. Our model
results remain similar and support the conclusion that a cash payment premium for Revlon-mode deals
does not drive our results. Our results thus address the point raised by Professor Gubler, who noted this
issue and that none of these studies looked at the effect of Revlon itself. Gubler, supra note 103, at 21.
106. In unreported results, our results are similar when we relax our definition to within 20% of
size, which includes sixty MOEs.
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Mergers of Equals
Non-MOEs

# of Bidding Rounds
Negotiation Days
Log Negotiation Days
Multiple Bidders
Indicator
Offer Premium

MOEs

Mean

N

Mean

N

t-statistic (diff.)

5.39
132.16
4.39
0.55

1,878
1,805
1,853
1,890

2.68
67.40
3.11
0.26

19
20
20
23

4.32***
3.25***
3.17***
3.11***

0.34

1,797

0.14

22

4.11***

p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
As shown in Table 9, we find that MOEs differ from non-MOEs in the
number of bidding rounds, length of negotiation time, incidence of multiple
bidders, and offer premiums. Moreover, these differences are all statistically
significant. However, MOEs do still involve multiple bidders 26% of the time.
In other words, multiple bidders do not appear only in non-MOEs.
To determine whether MOEs drive our main empirical results, we re-ran all
models excluding MOEs. Our results remain statistically significant with similar
magnitudes. This implies MOEs are not driving our results. Thus, in similar
transactions subject to Revlon and not subject to Revlon, our results still hold.
These results show the fundamental differences between Revlon and non-Revlon
transactions do not drive our main empirical findings.
In unreported results, we further examined the difference between Revlon
and non-Revlon deals by measuring bid-jumping. We find that 4.83% of nonRevlon deals receive a third-party competing bid after transaction announcement,
compared to 6.08% of Revlon deals. The t-statistic for this difference is 1.17,
which is not statistically significant. Running these tests for Delaware deals only,
we find that non-Revlon bids are jumped at a rate of 6.00% of deals while Revlon
deals are jumped at a rate of 6.31%. The t-statistic for this difference is 0.17,
which is again statistically insignificant. These results offer further support that
hidden differences between Revlon and non-Revlon deals do not drive our main
empirical findings.
In sum, our empirical analysis finds that Revlon transactions experience
longer negotiation periods, more bidding rounds, more incidence of multiple
bidders, and higher premiums. These empirical results are robust against tests
designed to confirm that neither Delaware nor the peculiarity of transactions
subject to Revlon drive our findings.
III.
HOW REVLON MATTERS
We now have the evidence to answer the question with which we began.
Yes, Revlon matters. For Delaware companies, Revlon affects the negotiation
process, the number of bidders, and the transaction premium. But our basic
empirical results also provide insights into two questions. First, how exactly does
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Revlon matter? And second, in light of the shifts in the doctrine over time, should
courts contract or expand Revlon now or in the future? We consider each
question in turn.
A. Revlon Matters as a Monitoring Standard
We begin with the empirical insight noted above: Revlon matters for target
firms incorporated in Delaware but not for non-Delaware targets.107 Although
the Revlon standard has been adopted into the law of eight other states and the
substance of the doctrine is the same across jurisdictions, Revlon matters only
for companies incorporated under Delaware law.108 This points squarely to the
role of courts. Although companies incorporated in one state may be sued in
another,109 Delaware-incorporated companies are subject to suit in Delaware and
their home state while companies incorporated in other states are most often sued
elsewhere.110 Our findings thus suggest that the Delaware courts use the Revlon
standard to monitor transactions more strictly than other courts and that
transacting parties respond in the planning and execution of transactions
involving Delaware companies.
The distinction between what the law says and how it is applied has been
described as the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules.111
Alternatively, the same distinction can also be characterized as the divergence
between standards of conduct and standards of review.112 The two standards
converge largely through the mediation of legal advisers.113 When lawyers
advise clients ex ante, what they say about the requirements of the law (the
standard of conduct) is frequently affected by their professional assessment of
how judges will (or have) interpreted those requirements (the standard of

107. See supra Part II.D.2.a.
108. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
109. When companies are sued in another forum, the law of the state of incorporation applies.
See generally Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No-Pay Provisions Can Fix the Deal
Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES 292
(Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019).
110. Delaware companies now often adopt forum selection bylaws in favor of Delaware,
increasing the odds that Delaware will be the exclusive forum for corporate law litigation. Without such
provisions, however, merger litigation often unfolded concurrently in the home state and in Delaware.
See Cain & Solomon, A Great Game, supra note 37, at 476 (highlighting the multi-state aspects of
merger litigation); see also Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053 (2013) (discussing the policy implications of merger litigation in
multiple jurisdictions).
111. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (explaining the distinction as a reflection of the desire to
create and communicate strict conduct rules interpreted by more forgiving decision rules).
112. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 463 (1993) (noting that “corporate law presents
a textbook case of the distinction between conduct rules and decisional rules.”).
113. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 111, at 640–41 (noting that “legal advice [concerning] relevant
decision rules . . . reduces acoustic separation.”).
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review).114 The standard of review thus gives specific meaning to the standard
of conduct. In this way, well-advised clients adapt their conduct to the law as
applied, rather than as it is written.
Our finding—that clients adapt their conduct to Revlon in Delaware but not
in other jurisdictions—suggests that the doctrine has meaning primarily as a
standard of review.115 As a standard of conduct, Revlon has one meaning in all
jurisdictions: maximize shareholder wealth in transactions to which it applies.116
But as a standard of review applied by different state court judges, Revlon can
(and does) take on different meanings. Delaware’s interpretation of Revlon as a
standard of review involves enhanced judicial scrutiny from rationality to
reasonableness review.117 Other state courts may differ in their interpretation of
the standard of review or in their analysis of reasonableness. Moreover, it may
not be that boards intentionally act differently but that lax enforcement leads to
less aggressive shopping conduct in the sale process. In other words, given lower
enforcement levels, managers and their advisors may simply not be incentivized
to try as hard.
Delaware’s prominence as a state of incorporation may also impact why
Revlon matters only in Delaware. A byproduct of Delaware’s leading status as a
jurisdiction of incorporation is that the members of the Court of Chancery hear
more corporate law disputes than judges in other states.118 This allows Delaware
114. This follows from Holmes’ famous observation that the science of the law is prediction. See,
e.g., O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897) (“[A] legal duty so called
is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or
that way by judgment of the court; — and so of a legal right.”).
115. See Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co. (U.S.), Inc., No. 1091-VCL, 2013 WL 458373, at *2
n.3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013) (“What changes under Revlon is not the universal and loyalty-based standard
of conduct that obligates a fiduciary to strive to maximize value for the beneficiary, but rather the
standard of review that a court uses when reviewing the fiduciary’s decisions, which narrows from
rationality to range-of-reasonableness.”); accord Laster, Revlon is a Standard of Review, supra note 63,
at 6.
116. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 849 (Del. 2016) (en banc) (“Revlon neither
creates a new type of fiduciary duty in the sale-of-control context nor alters the nature of the fiduciary
duties that generally apply. Rather, Revlon emphasizes that the board must perform its fiduciary duties
in the service of a specific objective: maximizing the sale price of the enterprise.”) (quoting Malpiede v.
Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001) (en banc)); see also supra notes 16–18 and accompanying
text.
117. See In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(“Although linguistically not obvious, this reasonableness review is more searching than rationality
review, and there is less tolerance for slack by the directors.”); accord Laster, Revlon is a Standard of
Review, supra note 63, at 6 (characterizing Revlon as a “standard of review under which the extent of
judicial deference given to board decisions narrows from rationality to range-of-reasonableness”).
118. More than half of all public companies and an even larger share (67.2%) of Fortune 500
companies incorporate in Delaware. See Annual Report Statistics, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS.,
https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Annual-Reports/Division-of-Corporations-2018-Annual-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2VA-X8A6]. For commentary on this fact, see, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk
& Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 389 (2003) (finding that
Delaware leads in a large sample of public firms); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 538 (2001) (finding that Delaware leads in a study of IPOs); Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 244
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judges to develop precedent on specific aspects of merger transactions that
judges in other states may never have seen. At the same time, because cases are
decided under general principles of fiduciary duty, Delaware’s corporate law
jurisprudence remains highly flexible and fact-specific.119 Although fiduciary
duty is the basis of corporate law in all states, other states have less factual
precedent to guide its application. The result is standards like Revlon have less
specific meaning in states where they are less often applied.120 Indeed, our
findings suggest Revlon may have no meaning at all outside of Delaware.
Why Revlon remains toothless in other states is unclear. Other states’
judges may interpret reasonableness as essentially indistinct from deference.
Alternatively, transaction planners may predict that judges will do so.121 We can
say, however, that the opposite is true of the Delaware judiciary. Revlon matters
in Delaware because Court of Chancery judges take seriously the opportunity to
review transactions for reasonableness. And because the judges of the Court of
Chancery take reasonableness review seriously, well-advised parties do so as
well. As a result, we find Revlon is reflected in the planning and execution of
transactions involving Delaware companies.
Our findings thus reveal the role of Revlon in Delaware today: as a tool of
the judiciary to monitor bias in M&A transactions. Revlon orders the transaction
process and prevents managers, bankers, and lawyers from slacking in the
service of shareholders. This account is consistent with Revlon’s place in
corporate law theory as well as the doctrine’s historical development. As
described above, the standard grew out of a case in which a manager imposed
his own views to steer a sale process. This standard was subsequently applied in
Macmillan and other cases to prevent management biases from infecting sale
processes.122 The Court of Chancery has continued to police transactions for
management biases, often in altered forms, as the Revlon doctrine developed

(1985) (providing a significant study of reincorporations and jurisdictional choice of Fortune 100
companies).
119. See Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the
Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1, 11 (2005) (“Because of the high degree of fact-specificity inherent in
fiduciary-duty adjudication, corporate law judges are less bound by principles of res judicata and stare
decisis than judges in other areas of law.”); accord Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware
Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2000) (noting that
the binding effect of stare decisis is limited in Delaware, because the Delaware Supreme Court can
“deny that it is overruling a precedent by using case specific facts to distinguish its prior holding.
Similarly the court can narrow the precedential effect of its decisions by framing its holdings narrowly
and tying those holdings to specific facts”) (footnote omitted).
120. Delaware may also influence conduct though statements in dicta designed to guide
transaction planning going forward. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (“Delaware courts generate in the first
instance the legal standards of conduct (which influence the development of the social norms of
directors, officers, and lawyers) largely through what can best be thought of as ‘corporate law
sermons.’”).
121. These would be interesting questions for further research.
122. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
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over the course of decades.123 As a result, Delaware transaction planners adjusted
deal structures accordingly. That planners did not do so in other jurisdictions
suggests the core meaning of Revlon is not the one-sentence recitation of the rule.
Rather, the core meaning of Revlon is the demonstrated willingness of the
judiciary to intervene when circumstances suggest management bias.
Jurisdictions without that history cannot make Revlon matter.
B. Should Delaware Retreat From Revlon?
Yet the recent history of Delaware jurisprudence suggests a retreat from
substantive judicial review.124 Transaction structures that might once have been
challenged under Revlon have been expressly endorsed, including managementled single-bidder sale processes and strong deal protection provisions.125 The
recent decision that most commentators cite for this retreat is Corwin.126
As described above, Corwin ostensibly substitutes procedural protections
for substantive judicial review in transactions where Revlon would otherwise
apply. Specifically, Corwin holds that if the transaction wins the majority vote
of fully informed, uncoerced shareholders, the standard of review shifts from
enhanced scrutiny to business judgment rule deference.127 Corwin does not
change the standard of conduct.128 Boards must still maximize shareholder value.
But, as we argued in the prior Section, conduct in fact converges upon the
standard of review. By eliminating Revlon as a standard of review, Corwin at
first blush suggests that many more M&A transactions will escape substantive
judicial scrutiny.129

123. See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc., S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1002 (Del. Ch. 2005) (noting
that the “paradigmatic context for a good Revlon claim” is one where “a supine board[,] under the sway
of an overweening CEO bent on a certain direction, tilts the sales process for reasons inimical to the
stockholders’ desire for the best price”); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del.
Ch. 2011); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007). Although Revlon
has been used to enjoin relatively few transactions, Delaware judges have shown a willingness to use
Revlon as a teaching platform, channeling conduct through criticism of bad actors. See Rock, supra note
120, at 1016. Similarly, Revlon raises the likelihood of success on the merits, which increases settlement
value and thereby the deterrence effect in applicable cases, notwithstanding whether an injunction
ultimately issues. See Friedlander, supra note 39, at 883.
124. See Solomon & Thomas, supra note 11.
125. See J. Travis Laster, Changing Attitudes: The Stark Results of Thirty Years of Evolution in
Delaware M&A Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION 202, 222 (Sean Griffith et al. eds., 2018) (cataloging these changes and attributing them to
“the rise of sophisticated stockholders” as a substitute for shareholder litigation).
126. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) (en banc). For extended discussion of the Corwin decision in the
context of Revlon, see supra notes 42–53 and accompanying text.
127. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 308.
128. See Eisenberg, supra note 112, at 463 (noting that the standard of review can shift without
moving the standard of conduct “in those cases where the standard of review is dramatically shifted
when a given type of conduct has been approved by a designated corporate organ, while the standard of
conduct remains unchanged”).
129. See Anabtawi, supra note 84.
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Nevertheless, our empirical analysis does not suggest that Corwin or C&J
immediately affected transactions. In unreported tests we find no statistically
significant differences in our models, including bidding rates, before or after
C&J and Corwin.130 This may be attributable to a number of factors. First,
transaction planning may respond to norms more directly than changes in the
law, and norms may change more slowly than law. Corwin takes place at the tail
end of our sample—in the last two years—and insofar as transaction planners act
on the basis of norms built up over decades, it may take them more than two
years to fully internalize Corwin.
A second possibility is that Corwin and C&J have changed the state of play
with regard to Revlon less than many suppose. That is, whatever the cases may
say, Delaware courts will still find a way to intervene in transactions where there
is evidence of biased processes. The plaintiffs’ bar will tirelessly test transactions
for signs of bias and find some way to raise what they find in court. And the
Court of Chancery will find some doctrinal basis to intervene.
The absence of a “Corwin effect” in our data may thus reflect the
transaction planners’ prediction that little of substance has in fact changed. This
possibility has additional support in our results, which find that Revlon and nonRevlon transactions are continuously accorded different treatment in spite of
shifts in the Revlon doctrine over time. Transaction planners apparently know to
disregard these surface-level shifts. If Corwin is just another surface level shift,
transaction planners have not been fooled. The evidence suggests they have
continued to design transaction structures capable of surviving enhanced
scrutiny.
More broadly, it is important to observe that Revlon exists within a larger
context of management constraints, such as independent boards and active
shareholders, each of which has shifted over time. We argue here (and one of us
has argued elsewhere) that Revlon arose as a tool to keep management
accountable when other constraints have made them less so.131 In this way, it can
be viewed as a substitute for other constraints, whether legal, structural, or
market-based. At the time Revlon was decided, boards were often weak—the
“torpid, if not supine” board in Macmillan is the classic example132—and
shareholders were often passive.133
Times have changed. Inside corporations, boards became more independent
and more likely to exert a structural constraint on management.134 At the same
130. We similarly find no difference in our results before and after Lyondell Chemical Corp. v.
Ryan, another case which arguably relaxed the Revlon standard by effectively limiting damages claims
under the standard to actions not in good faith. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 240
(Del. 2009) (en banc).
131. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions, supra note 60, at 1945–47.
132. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989).
133. See Solomon & Thomas, supra note 11.
134. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005:
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
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time, outside the boardroom, institutional shareholders and especially activist
hedge funds came to exert a greater structural constraint on management.135
Insofar as Revlon has weakened at the same time that these other constraints have
strengthened, the result may be a constant level of constraint.136 Revlon may be
less necessary in a world where other constraints apply, and Corwin may be just
another chapter in this story.137
Moreover, judicial intervention in transactions did not end with Corwin.
Delaware courts have now decided a series of cases challenging parties’ attempts
to avoid judicial scrutiny by invoking Corwin. These cases have denied motions
to dismiss on the basis of coercion in the vote,138 inadequate disclosures to
shareholders,139 and the existence of a controlling shareholder:140 Delaware
courts have thereby preserved an avenue for judicial intervention. As long as
there are openings for plaintiffs to contest the applicability of Corwin, the route
to judicial scrutiny remains open.
However, the cases contesting Corwin’s applicability principally involve
second-order concerns rather than the central question: namely, whether
135. See Laster, Changing Attitudes, supra note 125; Solomon & Thomas, supra note 11; see
also Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 263 (2019).
Claims of the triviality of corporate law are nothing new. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013).
136. See Solomon & Thomas, supra note 11; Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 389.
137. This argument was first made previously in Solomon & Thomas, supra note 11.
138. See, e.g., In re Saba Software, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10697-VCS, 2017 WL 1201108,
at *16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2017, revised Apr. 11, 2017) (finding coercion where stockholders would hold
delisted stock if they voted down the deal); Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., No. 11418-VCG,
2017 WL 2352152, at *22 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017) (finding coercion where stockholders were told
underlying transaction would not occur unless they also approved other matters).
139. See, e.g., Appel v. Berkman, 180 A.3d 1055, 1064 (Del. 2018) (holding stockholder vote
was not fully informed because proxy disclosed that the founder and chairman abstained from the
board’s recommendation in favor of sale without explaining the reason for abstention); Morrison v.
Berry, 191 A.3d 268, 280–84 (Del. 2018) (holding Corwin inapplicable due to disclosure deficiencies
relating to a founder’s unwillingness to consider other bidders and “troubling facts regarding director
behavior”); In re Comverge, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 7368-VCMR, at 8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2016) (order
denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment) (denying summary judgment because of factual
questions as to whether shareholders were fully informed of all material information); van der Fluit v.
Yates, No. 12553-VCMR, 2017 WL 5953514, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017) (declining Corwin
dismissal due to failure to disclose identity of individuals who led sales outreach and possible
involvement of persons receiving post-transaction employment and conversion of options).
140. See, e.g., In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293,
at *19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (holding that in spite of owning only 22.1% of Tesla stock, Elon Musk’s
influence on the transaction made him a controlling shareholder, rendering Corwin inapplicable), appeal
denied sub nom. Musk v. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., 184 A.3d 1292 (Del. 2018) (mem.); see also Ann M.
Lipton, After Corwin: Down the Controlling Shareholder Rabbit Hole, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1977, 1977–
78 (2019) (analyzing the controlling shareholder test in the wake of Corwin and arguing that courts
should look not only to influence over the board but also to alternatives realistically available to
unaffiliated shareholders). But see In re Rouse Props., Inc., No. 12194-VCS, 2018 WL 1226015, at *19
(Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018) (applying Corwin and holding that plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts
concerning “clout and retributive power” for court to treat a 33.5% stockholder as controlling).
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management bias is present in the planning and execution of the transaction.
Whether the alternatives presented in a shareholder vote are coercive, whether
the disclosures are adequate, or whether a large minority shareholder ought to
count as controlling are, in a sense, procedural questions. They do not directly
address the substance of whether the transaction was designed to maximize
shareholder wealth. Insofar as the questions under Corwin—the propriety of the
vote and the adequacy of the disclosures—are procedural, the analysis is
different in kind from prior cases under Revlon. These cases shifted the degree
of substantive judicial scrutiny to be applied depending on the facts of the
transaction. Transaction planners may thus respond to Corwin with procedural
changes—for example, by making their proxy statements longer and more
detailed, particularly when describing the background of the merger. Indeed,
transaction planners suggest that this has already begun to occur.141 But insofar
as such procedural adaptations have less powerful wealth effects than, for
example, more active bidding or higher premiums, Corwin’s contraction of the
Revlon doctrine may indeed affect shareholder wealth.142
On the other hand, it may not matter whether the central question of
management bias is addressed directly, as in Revlon, or indirectly, as in
Corwin—so long as the question is raised. And indeed, there is at least some
evidence that pleadings under Corwin addressing issues of procedure are
frequently argued in ways that raise core substantive concerns. For example,
omitted disclosures are especially concerning precisely when they suggest
ulterior motivations of management.143 Likewise, an influential shareholder may
be more likely to be treated as a controller when he or she is strongly selfinterested in the underlying transaction.144 As long as such substantive issues can

141. Statement at the “Delaware Developments” panel of the 31st Tulane Corporate Law Institute
(Mar. 15, 2019).
142. To be certain, in other areas of Delaware law procedural restrictions have been found to
create value. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form over Substance? The Value of
Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849 (2011) (finding that MBO
transactions with procedural protections provide greater value to target shareholders); Guhan
Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory and Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007) (finding
that minority shareholders achieve significantly lower abnormal returns, on average, in tender-offer
freeze-outs relative to merger freeze-outs with different procedural protections).
143. See, e.g., In re Xura, Inc., Stockholder Litig., No. 12698-VCS, 2018 WL 6498677, at *13
(Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2018) (discussing a failure to disclose facts relating to $25 million payout and future
employment package to CEO in connection with a deal that undervalued the target); In re Tangoe, Inc.
Stockholders Litig., No. 2017-0650-JRS, 2018 WL 6074435, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2018)
(discussing a failure to disclose directors’ motivation to sell the company arising from compensationbased incentives).
144. For example, indicia of Elon Musk’s self-interest were all over the Tesla-SolarCity merger.
See, e.g., supra note 142. Musk chaired both companies and was SolarCity’s largest shareholder.
Additionally, SolarCity was founded by Musk’s two cousins, with substantial support and
encouragement from Musk himself. Musk had taken out millions of dollars in personal credit lines to
buy shares in the company, and his aerospace company, SpaceX, had purchased $165 million in bonds
issued by SolarCity. See Austin Carr, The Real Story Behind Elon Musk’s $2.6 Billion Acquisition Of
SolarCity And What It Means For Tesla’s Future—Not To Mention The Planet’s, FAST CO. (June 7,
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be raised in challenging the procedural aspects of Corwin, judges can deny
motions to dismiss and get to the substance of the transaction.
Ultimately, it may be too early to tell whether Corwin has contracted the
Revlon doctrine in a way that harms shareholders. If it has, it has not yet turned
up in our empirical results. Our theory of how Revlon affects transactions,
however, suggests that courts should not read Corwin in such a way that its
procedural aspects overwhelm their ability to intervene in biased transactions.
Insofar as what matters is the availability of a pathway into the substance of
transactions, Corwin should not be interpreted in such a way as to block that
path.
C. Should Delaware Expand Revlon?
If our core finding suggests that the scope of Revlon ought not to be shrunk
too far, perhaps it also implies that the doctrine ought to be expanded. Given that
most of the non-Revlon transactions in our sample are defined primarily by the
choice of consideration, Revlon could be expanded to deals involving a smaller
fraction of cash consideration.145 It could also cover MOEs.146 Or it could expand
still farther, as some have suggested, to encompass the buy-side as well.147
Should it?
The logic for expanding Revlon is intuitive. First, as we have found,
negotiations are more intense, bidders more numerous, and premiums richer
when Revlon applies. Second, the doctrine’s trigger—the fraction of cash
consideration in the deal—seems largely arbitrary. Deals with 52% cash
consideration do not seem fundamentally different from deals with 47% cash
consideration. Furthermore, there is an argument that any standard that results in
more bidding, higher premiums, and ultimately greater shareholder wealth
should be expanded to all negotiated acquisitions.148 If shareholder wealth
maximization is the goal and Revlon serves to increase shareholder wealth,
shouldn’t we want more Revlon?
We are not so sure. Increasing shareholder wealth in the context of
acquisitions is essentially a zero-sum game: higher premiums merely transfer
wealth from buyers to sellers. Diversified shareholders, as Professor Bainbridge
and others have pointed out, are largely indifferent because they will be on both

2017),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40422076/the-real-story-behind-elon-musks-2-6-billionacquisition-of-solarcity-and-what-it-means-for-teslas-future-not-to-mention-the-planets
[perma.cc/NL7U-MPJ3].
145. We define non-Revlon deals as those either (i) taking place in a state that had not adopted
Revlon or (ii) consisting of less than 50% cash consideration. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying
text.
146. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
147. See Afsharipour & Laster, supra note 70.
148. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (reviewing this argument, as made by Vice
Chancellor Laster).
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sides of such transactions, at least when each company is public.149 By
exempting public stock-based deals and deals not resulting in a controlling
shareholder, the Revlon doctrine avoids invoking scrutiny in deals where
diversified shareholders are likely indifferent to the distribution of wealth
between buyers and sellers. At the same time, Revlon applies to those
transactions that matter most to diversified shareholders—that is, deals where
they are not on both sides due to a private buyer and deals in which the
appearance of a controlling shareholder raises the specter of private benefits of
control. Whether the doctrine is responsive to last-period concerns or other
doubts concerning board independence remains an open question.150 But we
consider it an achievement of the Delaware courts to have arrived at this balance
without going down the rabbit-hole of asking whose wealth—diversified or nondiversified shareholders—corporate law should maximize.151 Perhaps, in other
words, Revlon should stay right where it is.
In making this claim, we are mindful of avoiding the Goldilocks fallacy.
We are not claiming that Revlon in its current form is optimally designed or
optimally applied. Indeed, we agree that basing application of the doctrine on
whether a buyer used 51% cash versus 49% cash is essentially arbitrary. We
readily admit that Revlon has been invoked successfully in cases where it ought
not to have applied152 and that it has not been applied in transactions where vast
sums of shareholder wealth have been destroyed.153 However, as discussed at
length above, Revlon is not a fixed rule but rather a flexible monitoring standard.
The precise contours of the rule thus matter less than the possibility that the
judiciary will take a closer look at apparently biased transactions. As long as
Revlon is applied flexibly, we need not be overly concerned about whether it is
applied too much or too little on the margin. What is important is that scrutiny
applies in scenarios giving specific cause for concern—for example, in lastperiod transactions where boards lack independence and shareholders are passive
and generally disengaged. As long as the judiciary remains attentive to that basic
problem, specific doctrinal shifts are of secondary concern. Revlon, at its core,
does just that.
149. Bainbridge, Geography of Revlon-Land, supra note 71, at 3310. The core insight goes back
at least to Easterbrook & Fischel. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 54.
150. See supra Part II.B.
151. We consider this an interesting academic question. See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi,
Maximizing the Wealth of Fictional Shareholders: Which Fiction Should Directors Embrace?, 32 J.
CORP. L. 381 (2007). But it is likely one that judges would prefer to avoid, since answering it would
have far-reaching and unforeseeable consequences beyond the case at hand.
152. The recent flood of merger litigation would be a prime example. See supra notes 33–40 and
accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). The
Time/Warner transaction destroyed vast sums of shareholder wealth to pursue a transaction favored by
management in spite of a plainly superior alternative, in the form of Paramount’s cash tender offer for
Time, yet it did not trigger Revlon scrutiny. See generally RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK,
(SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT (1993) (describing the economic effects of
the transaction and its immediate aftermath).
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This brings us back, once again, to Corwin and C&J. One reading of those
cases is that, together, they prune back the overgrowth of Revlon. As a result of
those cases, enhanced scrutiny no longer applies in cases lacking an obvious
conflict of interest in which no intervening bidder appears.154 Under this reading,
in the post-Corwin, post-C&J world, the Revlon doctrine is restored to its
foundational context: an intervening bidder seeking an injunction against board
conduct in a competitive bidding situation.155 Indeed, the Supreme Court
explained Corwin in precisely this way:
[A]s the years go by, people seem to forget that Revlon was largely about
a board’s resistance to a particular bidder and its subsequent attempts to
prevent market forces from surfacing the highest bid. QVC was of a
similar ilk. But in this case, there was no barrier to the emergence of
another bidder and more than adequate time for such a bidder to
emerge.156
Understood in this way, what Corwin and C&J did was restore the Revlon
doctrine to its proper role: operating as a judicial check in cases where normal
constraints on management would otherwise be absent.157 When substitute
constraints are present—as in the case of an open process where other bidders
have had an opportunity but have failed to emerge—the doctrine might not be
needed.
Because we are sympathetic to these readings of Corwin and Revlon, we do
not necessarily believe that Revlon should be expanded or contracted. Revlon
should remain flexible enough to apply as needed. But therein lies the danger of
Corwin. Insofar as Corwin focuses judicial analysis on procedural aspects of the
vote and not on the substance of the transaction itself, it may not provide
sufficient flexibility for the judiciary to intervene in biased transactions as
needed. The danger, in other words, lies in the risk that Corwin will ossify into
a rule-based analysis of procedural requirements, leaving no space for the
judiciary to intervene in biased transactions.

154. In other words, “non-Revlon, Revlon” cases. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
155. See supra Part I.B.
156. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107
A.3d 1049, 1070 (Del. 2014) (en banc) (footnote omitted). Moreover, the court substantially frowned
on the type of injunction here, holding that not only had the wrong standard been applied, but a
mandatory injunction of this type could only be imposed after a trial and a finding that the third-party
bidder had aided and abetted the breach. See id. at 1071–73.
157. We recognize that some have argued that the Delaware courts are engaging in revisionist
history in C&J Energy. See, e.g., Gubler, supra note 103, at 20 (arguing that the Delaware Supreme
Court in C&J Energy rejected a more capacious view of Revlon put forth in Barkan). We would argue,
however, that Revlon was designed to meet the problems of the 1980s, which were boards and
management unduly attempting to affect the outcome of a takeover. In other words, the actual factual
paradigm of Revlon. C&J Energy merely recognizes the evolved market landscape of the current capital
markets.
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D. Revlon’s Next 35 Years
The future of Revlon depends on the interpretation and implementation of
Corwin and C&J and courts’ demonstrated willingness to intervene in
substantively biased transactions. Having found that Revlon has value, in
Delaware at least, we think it is important that the doctrine remain available as a
means of entry for corporate law courts to evaluate potentially biased
transactions. Therefore, as we have already argued, Corwin and C&J should not
be interpreted in such a way as to prevent courts from focusing on the core
question of managerial bias. But how are they supposed to do this? How should
courts interpret Corwin and C&J to preserve the underlying value of Revlon?
In our view, courts should approach the second-order procedural questions
under Corwin from the perspective of the first-order substantive issue in Revlon.
Corwin, as we have noted, focuses courts on the procedural prerequisites of a
fair and fully informed vote of the shareholders.158 Cases decided in Corwin’s
wake have focused on such questions as when shareholder voting is coerced and
when disclosures are adequate.159 Is the evidence presented probative of
managerial bias in the underlying transaction? If so, the court should be hesitant
to shift the standard of review back to the business judgment rule. If not, the
court should grant the vote its full cleansing effect.
To make these considerations more concrete, consider the question of the
adequacy of disclosure necessary to render a shareholder vote “fully informed”
under Corwin. There are several lines of cases from Delaware addressing
adequacies of disclosure. For example, in the context of so-called “disclosure
settlements,” omissions and corrective disclosures must be “plainly material.”160
By contrast, in the context of “mootness dismissals,” i.e. cases resulting in
corrective disclosures but no class-wide release of claims, the Court of Chancery
has held that supplemental disclosures need only be “helpful.”161 The disclosures
that have become typical in shareholder litigation—additional proxy statement
descriptions of the calculations underlying a financial advisor’s fairness opinion,
for example—are now judged according to one or the other of these standards,
depending upon whether the claim was resolved in settlement or mooted.162
Neither of these standards is apt for deciding the adequacy of disclosures
under Corwin. Instead, the inquiry should be focused on the substance
underlying Revlon scrutiny. Further detail on the financial advisors’ math is
almost never relevant to a Revlon analysis, but evidence of management bias is.

158. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 140–141 (compiling cases).
160. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016); see also supra
text accompanying note 53.
161. See, e.g., In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 WL 4146425, at *3
(Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016) (holding that the standard for disclosures on a mootness fee application is not
materiality but rather whether the disclosure was helpful and benefited the class).
162. See Matthew D. Cain et al., Mootness Fees, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1777, 1779–80 (2019).
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Courts evaluating the quality of disclosures under Corwin should therefore look
to information that is probative of management bias, not matters that would be
irrelevant to an application of enhanced scrutiny. If the plaintiffs succeed in
uncovering previously undisclosed evidence of management bias, the
shareholder vote should not count as “fully informed” and the cleansing effect
of Corwin should not apply.
Fortunately, there is evidence that Delaware courts are moving in precisely
this direction in analyzing the adequacy of disclosures under Corwin. For
example, in Morrison v. Berry, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a vote was
not fully informed due to the company’s failure to disclose a benefit made
available to the company’s founder: the opportunity to roll over his equity
interest.163 This benefit would not likely have been available from other bidders,
thereby biasing the founder in favor of the transaction. By taking issue with this
lack of disclosure, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s
determination that the omitted information would not have made stockholders
less likely to tender, emphasizing that information may be material if a
stockholder would “generally want to know [it] in making the decision,
regardless of whether it actually sways a stockholder one way or the
other . . . .”164 Management’s potential bias in favor of a transaction is plainly
something a shareholder would want to know. Similarly, in van der Fluit v.
Yates, the Court of Chancery held that a vote was not fully informed because the
target had failed to disclose that the company’s co-founders were the ones
soliciting bids for the company and that, in the process, they had obtained
commitments for post-transaction employment.165 In each of these cases, the
inadequacies of disclosure point to management bias in the transaction. Having
found them, the courts refused to apply Corwin and therefore retained their
ability to inquire further under Revlon.166
A similar focus can (and should) be applied to judicial analyses of coercion
under Corwin. If the facts suggest that management has exerted pressure to push
through a transaction in which it has a particular interest to the exclusion of other
corporate alternatives, courts should be more open to finding coercion. If by
contrast, there is no evidence of management bias, but simply a lack of good
options available to the company, the courts should be less open to finding
163. 191 A.3d 268, 285 (Del. 2018).
164. Id. at 287.
165. No. 12553-VCMR, 2017 WL 5953514, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017) (dismissing the
complaint on other grounds).
166. We recognize the lacunae in this argument. If Revlon is preserved through the ability for
judges to intervene when there are substantive issues, it still leaves open the issue of when the corrective
for inadequate disclosure is just better disclosure prior to the vote, and not enhanced judicial scrutiny of
the substance. In other words, this still leaves open the possibility of evading enhanced scrutiny through
full disclosure. However, we think this outcome is unlikely. Delaware courts are courts of equity and, in
the face of an openly disclosed conflict, will likely find a plausible basis for substantive intervention.
We acknowledge this is speculation, however, and leave this issue open, depending upon future
developments.
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coercion. Again, there is some evidence that Delaware courts are moving in this
direction.167
In sum, insofar as judicial analyses of questions arising under Corwin
continue to be guided by considerations that would be relevant under Revlon,
there is no need to fear the death of enhanced scrutiny. In their analyses of
disclosure inadequacies under Corwin, courts should focus on whether the
alleged omission is probative of management bias. Likewise, in their analyses of
coercion, courts should focus on whether the claim of coercion is grounded on a
plausible theory of management bias. In doing so, courts will avoid deferring to
transactions that raise concerns under Revlon. And, by continuing to apply
enhanced scrutiny to these transactions, courts ensure that transaction planners
do not disregard the doctrine, thereby destroying the value we have found in it.
What of the other states in our sample that have adopted Revlon?168 To our
knowledge none of these states have adopted Corwin or a case like it and
therefore need not frame its analysis of disclosures or voting procedures in a way
that preserves Revlon. But, as we argued above, these states have a more basic
obstacle in achieving the benefits of enhanced scrutiny. They have not
demonstrated a credible commitment to intervention in biased transactions. As a
result, in spite of having Revlon on the books, the doctrine has had no apparent
effect on transaction planning in those states. In order to make Revlon matter, the
courts in these states must use it.
CONCLUSION
We conduct an empirical and theoretical examination of whether and how
Revlon matters based upon a novel M&A dataset of 1,897 transactions from
2003-2017. We find that Revlon matters in Delaware: acquisitions of Delaware
firms have more bidding rounds, more bidders, and higher premiums when they
are subject to Revlon. Robustness checks confirm these results.
With respect to the question of how, we posit Revlon as a monitoring
standard whose value depends upon courts putting it into effect. Delaware drives
our results due to the unique form of judicial oversight practiced by Court of
Chancery. This account sheds light on recent decisions, such as Corwin and C&J,
that seem to restrict the scope of Revlon duties. We argue that as long as these
doctrinal shifts preserve a flexible entryway for judicial intervention into biased
transactions, then reports of the death of Revlon will prove to have been largely
exaggerated. However, should these doctrinal developments result in
substituting hard procedural rules for flexible substantive standards, then the
effectiveness of judicial scrutiny of M&A may indeed diminish. The Delaware
167. See, e.g., Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., No. 11418-VCG, 2017 WL 2352152,
at *3 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017) (“Fiduciaries cannot interlard [a stockholder] vote with extraneous acts
of self-dealing, and thereby use a vote driven by the net benefit of the transactions to cleanse their breach
of duty.”).
168. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.

2020]

DOES REVLON MATTER?

1731

judiciary should remain attentive to these issues. Meanwhile, judges in other
states should take note of the lifeless form of Revlon now occupying their
jurisdictions and consider the benefits of a Revlon revival.

